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ABSTRACT
In Part I the institutional factors affecting water distribution in the Upper
Colorado River Basin in general and specifically the Uintah Basin are presented. The
historical development of the appropriation doctrine of water allocation is outlined
and Utah water policy is examined. These institutional factors are analyzed in light of
the prototype oil shale development in the Uintah Basin and potential impact on the
area's agricultural sector. Oil shale water estimates are compared with Uintah Basin
water availability and examined with regard to population projections and municipal
water use. Lastly, Utah water policy and the appropriation doctrine are viewed as
restraints to efficient water transfers.
In Part II irrigation water is treated as a random variable. Its actual quantity is
not known ahead of time. If transfers of water to oil shale production affect the
variability of water used in agriculture then there will be impacts in agriculture even if
the farmers receive the same average quantity of water as originally. These impacts
are analyzed in the context of the expected utility maximization hypothesis, i.e., the
farmers are hypothesized to maximize expected utility. The measure of an increase in
variability is the "mean prese.rving spread." The analyses seek to determine the
impact upon expected (average) real income (utility), expected profits (net farm
income), purchased inputs, the price of water, and the price of land. The analyses are
conducted for both the case where the farmers are risk neutral and the case where
they are risk averse.

Ul

PREFACE
The so-called energy crisis produced renewed interest in national self-sufficiency
in energy production, a new look at "unconventional" energy sources such as oil
shale, tar sands, and coal gasification and liquefaction, and a spate of governmental
initiatives to encourage development.
The northeast section of Utah (the Uintah Basin) is a part of the rich oil shale
belt, and with the government leasing of two prototype sites on the White River
known as U a and Ub, it was believed by many people that oil shale development was
imminent. Studies were made of the water needs of an oil shale industry and
agricultural producers became threatened because they are the big users of water in
the area.
This study assesses the water situation in the Uintah Basin and explores the
likely effects of development of the prototype lease sites on agriculture. The study
consists of two parts: (1) An analysis of the current water demand-supply situation in
the area and the projected impact of oil shale development with particular emphasis
on agriculture, and (2) an analysis of the effects on farm production decisions of
increasing the variability of water deliveries resulting from water transfers. The first
part deals generally with the quantities of water available for agricultural production
while the second deals with issues that arise when the variability of those quantities is
increased even if the annual quantity of irrigation water available is unaffected.
This study was financed by a grant from the Office of Water Research and
Technology under its Title I Allotment Program. Gardner and Tew were responsible
for Part I dealing with the current demand supply situation and Lyon wrote Part II on .
the effects of increasing the variability of water supplies to irrigators.
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PART I
THE IMPACTS OF THE PROTOTYPE OIL SHALE
DEVELOPMENT ON AGRICULTURAL AND
MUNICIPAL WATER SUPPLIES

INTRODUCTION

administration policies with the need for energy
water will determine to a large extent if oil shale
operations will become a reality.

It has often been alleged that the development
of the arid western United States has been limited
by the lack of water. The amount of that resource
available has dictated agricultural production and
the location of settlements.
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Since the bulk of existing water rights in the
Upper Colorado River Basin is associated with
agriculture, there has been some concern that
increased energy water demands will have a
detrimental impact on the area's agriculture. In
attempting to assess the impact of oil shale
development upon existing agricultural water
supplies, this report will focus upon three principal
areas of investigation:

Recent years have witnessed large price
increases in energy, and the nation is searching for
new forms that are economically feasible and
environmentally acceptable. As a result, much
attention is being focused on the development 'of
alternatives to liquid petroleum.

1. To examine the current Utah water
policies, laws, regulations, as well as other factors
which are affecting the development of the state's
water resources. Much of the legislation governing
water use and development in Utah also incorporates aspects of broader, regional policies, such as
the Colorado River Compact and the Upper
Colorado River Compact. Therefore, water policies
will be investigated from a multi-state or regional
viewpoint as well as from the vantage point of
Utah's own water policies. Primary emphasis will
be placed upon the legislation and problems
dealing with the Upper Colorado River Basin.

Oil shale is one of the most abundant but
undeveloped forms of energy in the United States.
High grade deposits, located within the Green
River formation of Utah, Colorado, and Wyoming
(Upper Colorado River Basin), contain the
equivalent of 600 billion barrels of oil. Exploitation
of this' resource would offer a significant supplement to U.S. supplies of liquid petroleum. Studies
of the feasibility of oil shale indicate that the
availability of large quantities of water will play a
key role in determining to what extent an oil shale
industry can become a reality.
It is apparent that the legal right to utilize
water will be perhaps the most important factor in
the consideration of water for energy in the Upper
Colorado River Basin. From available data it is
obvious that present water availability exceeds that
which is presently utilized' in the basin. However, it
is also apparent that this quantity of water is in
turn exceeded by present rights granted by most
states in the area. The obvious conclusion is that
many appropriative rights granted to private
parties are not being fully utilized. Nonetheless,
these ,rights remain as charges against the future
availability of water in the oil shale rich areas. How
state water control agencies reconcile current water

2. To examine the oil shale development
firms, the mining and retorting processes, and the
associated water requirements. Likely alternatives
for obtaining water for oil shale will also be
studied.
3. To evaluate the impact of . oil shale
development on agriculture. The geographic area
of study will be the Uintah Basin in general and the
Ashley Valley-Vernal City area specifically. Population impacts in the Uintah Basin, water sources
for the basin and Ashley Valley, and the restraints
which exist regarding oil shale's use of agricultural
water will be examined.

1

UINTAH
UPPER

--

50

Flprel.

STUDY UNIT

COLORADO

0

RIVER

50

BASIN

100 Mil ..

,-

The study presumes that oil shale development
will reach only the prototype stage of development
in the near future. This represents a capacity of
approximately 100,000 barrels/day.

acre feet of water from any and all sources (USDI,
1974).
While the 1922 compact regulates the river as
to the allotment between the upper and lower
basins, it does not divide the water between the
individual states of each area. The Upper Basin
Compact of 1948 (USDI, 1974) allocates the water
to the four participating states of the upper basin
on a percentage basis in the following manner
(USDI, 1974):

FACTORSAFFECTUNGCURRENT
STATE WATER POLICY
Introduction

•

The very nature of the prior appropriation
doctrine is one of extensive institutional involvement in the allocation of water. The scarcity of
water throughout the west has prompted the
enactment of several major interstate and international compacts.

Colorado
Utah
New Mexico
Wyoming

51.7%
23.00/0
11.25%
14.0%

(Note: Arizona is guaranteed an annual flow of
50,000 acre feet from the upper basin allotment.)

Nowhere is this situation more apparent than
with the Colorado River, quite possibly the most
regulated waterway in the world. The legislation,
compacts, treaties, and other agreements which
govern the Colorado River system are known
collectively as the "Law of the River."

A major problem with the original Colorado
River Compact and the subsequent Upper Basin
Compact is that information upon which the initial
river flow was calculated was greatly overestimated
and the later Mexican Treaty obligations had not
been defined. Later years have shown that the
river's total flow at Lee Ferry is closer to 13.3 maf
than the original estimate of 15 maf (USDI, 1974).
Therefore, the upper basin's entitlement is
approximately 5.8 maf after fulfilling the lower
basin's flow requirements, which are still held at 75
maf in any given 10-year period. However, it is the
variability of the flow which has required the upper
basin states to develop considerable storage
capacity in order to reduce the effect of variability.
(This was the motivating force behind the Colorado
River Storage Project which included Glen Canyon
Dam and Flaming Gorge Dam.)

It is obvious, therefore, that allocation of
Utah's water resources will be done within this
institutional framework. Energy development will
have to compete with other demands for the state's
valuable water resources.

The purpose of this section is to explore the
regulations of the Colorado River system, explain
the appropriate doctrine as it relates to the State of
Utah, identify the competing demands for water
within the state, and present the current factors
and proposals affecting the development of a
state-wide water policy.
The Colorado River System .
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Based upon the more accurate estimate of the
total river flow (Noble, 1974), the percentage
division of the upper basin's allotment entitles the
four states to the following amounts of water:

The cornerstone of the body of law regulating
the Colorado River is the Colorado River Compact
of 1922. The parties involved are the federal
government, the states of Utah, Colorado, Arizona,
New Mexico, Wyoming, Nevada, and California.
The primary purpose of the compact is to distribute
the United States entitlement of flow of the river
equally between the upper basin states (Utah,
Colorado, Wyoming, and New Mexico) and the
lower basin states (Arizona, California, and
Nevada). Based upon pre-1920 data, the compact
established the total flow of the river available for
distribution among the upper and lower basin
states at 15 million acre feet (mat). The major
provision of the compact is one requiring the
upper basin states to deliver a minimum of 75 maf
to the lower basin states in any consecutive 10-year
period. The Mexican Water treaty of 1944
guarantees Mexico an annual quantity of 1,500,000

Colorado
Utah
Wyoming
New Mexico

2,976,000
1,322,000
805,000
627,000

af
af
af
af

It should be noted, however, that the above
data are based upon Bureau of Reclamation
estimates. The State of Utah generally takes a more
liberal view with regards to its entitlement, and
places the figure around 1.4 maf. It is that estimate
which will be utilized in this study. Also, the
Colorado River proper does not flow through Utah
. for any great distance. Nonetheless, 15 percent of
the virgin flow of the river at Lee Ferry does
originate in Utah (Lawrence and Saunders, 1975).
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maximize the use of the area's sc~rce water
resources. This use would be applied to all land
that could be reached by the water-not just those
areas contiguous to the surface water channels.

Before outlining Utah's current and projected
uses of the state's Colorado River allotment,
mention should be made of the appropriative
doctrine, which underpins all water-related development, and the statutory manner in which water
rights are obtained.

The church took possession of the region and
supervised the allotments of parcels of land to
settlers. These early rights were recognized by the
Mormon State of Deseret and the Territory of Utah
pending issuance of formal land titles by the
United States. It was also established that those
who had first made beneficial use of water should
be entitled to continued use in preference to those
who came later. This fundamental principle was to
be later sanctioned by the legislature and the courts
(Dewsnup and Jensen, 1973).

HIstorical

II

The early water users in the west were
generally miners and farmers who often trespassed
upon the public domain to divert water from
streams to the point of use. Because of the lack of
courts and established local procedure regarding
the use of water, these early inhabitants developed
their own local customs. They were usually related
to the same rules which governed mining districts
and claims.

These early methods were terminated with
statehood when the legislature provided that an
appropriation could only be obtained through
filing an application with the State Engineer.
(Note: Those who owned rights prior to 1903 but
had not yet perfected those rights in terms of
putting the water to beneficial use were given a
reasonable amount of time to do so. Of course,
those who had claim to water based upon pre-1903
action still held title to the water.)

When water-use conflicts did reach the courts,
the decisions tended to reflect these local
characteristics rather than the traditional riparian
views. The development of the west was dependent
upon successful farming and mining and these
activities were dependent upon water. Therefore,
the courts and the Congress, recognizing the
importance of such development, allowed water to
be withdrawn by anyone who could put it to ·a
beneficial use in accordance with the laws and
customs of the respective states. Thus the law of
prior appropriation was born.

This 1903 statute was revised and reenacted in
1905 and again in 1919. The 1919 law is the basis of
the present enactment contained in the Utah Code
Annotated (1953).

The essentials of the concept are that water
rights are acquired through the diverting of water
from a natural watercourse and applying it to a
beneficial use. This water right has a priority date
which reflects the date that action was first taken to
utilize the water. This priority establishes a
relationship between a particular water right and
all other water users on the stream. Those rights
superior (earlier) are guaranteed their water supply
before the needs of those inferior (later) can be
met.

The Utah Appropriation statute contains the
following declaration: "All waters in this state,
whether above or under the ground are hereby
declared to be the property of the public, subject to
all existing rights to the use thereof." (73-1-1)
"Rights to the use of the unappropriated public
waters in this state may be acquired only as
provided in this title " (73-3-1) (Hutchins, 1965).
The current laws, therefore, declare that the
state has the right to control the diversion and
distribution of the public waters within its
boundaries. The control of the diversion and
distribution of such public waters are vested in the
State Engineer, subject to judicial review and to the
constitutional provision recognizing and confirm··
ing existing rights to the use of waters for useful
and beneficial purposes (Dewsnup and Jensen,
1973). The statutes clearly make it the duty of the
state to appropriate the water in a manner that will
be in the best interests of the public.

The appropriation doctrine in Utah developed
in slightly different fashion than those areas where
water rules were related to mining claims. The
Mormon pioneers were the first Anglo-Saxons to
practice irrigation on an extensive scale in the
United States. Their colonization patterns involved
the establishment of many small communities
generally separated from each other by miles of
desert and mountains and as a result were largely
self-contained. The development of a cooperativetype irrigation system under church control was
usually one of the first activities of any new
settlement.

This statutory procedure is now the exclusive
method of appropriating water. Applications to
appropriate are filed in the office of the State
Engineer, and unappropriated water may be
acquired for any recognized beneficial use. Subject

The Mormon Church contemplated the
colonization of the Great Basin in such a way as to
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to compliance with the statutory procedure for
perfecting a water right, an application has priority
as of the date it was filed in the State Engineer's
office (Dewsnup and Jensen, 1973).

However, if a deed transferring land does not
specify otherwise, the water right passes with title
to the land (The Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Sec.
73-1-11).

The laws state that it is the duty of the State
Engineer to approve an application that meets the
filing requirements if: (a) there is unappropriated
water in the proposed source; (b) the proposed use
will not impair existing rights or interfere with
more beneficial use of the water; (c) the proposed
plan is physically and economically feasible and not
detrimental to the public welfare; and (d) the
applicant has the financial ability to complete the
proposed works and has applied for the appropriation in good faith and not for speculation or
monopoly. ' However, if the State Engineer has
reason to believe that more beneficial use of the
water for irrigation, domestic, stockwatering,
power, mining, or manufacturing purposes will be
interfered with or the public welfare will be
adversely affected, he must withhold approval or
rejection pending an investigation (Hutchins,
1965).

Current water uses
Utilizing the administrative mechanism just
outlined, Utah is currently depleting the Colorado
River by 825,000 acre feet annually (Hansen,
1975). Approximately 90 percent of the current
diversions are related to agriculture, with 5 percent
for municipal and industrial purposes, and 5
percent for managed wetlands. Of the municipal
and industrial uses, about 7,800 acre feet are
utilized in the production of thermal power
(Lawrence and Saunders, 1975).
Although it would appear that nearly 600,000
acre feet are still available for the state to allocate,
the current situation is one of strong competition
for the remaining water. The following pages will
discuss the problems facing Utah in allocating the
state's remaining Colorado River allotment among
the most likely water users.

Once an application is approved, the applicant
is given a specific time in which to place the water
to beneficial use and submit written proof of
appropriation. An applicant may be granted
additional time for completing construction of the
works and applying the water to beneficial use
upon a showing of diligence or reasonable cause for
delay (The Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Sec.
73-3-12). If an application lapses for failure of the
applicant to comply with the provisions of the act,
the State Engineer may, upon showing of
reasonable cause, reinstate the application. However, the priority date of the application must be
altered to reflect the date of reinstatement (The
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Sec. 73-3-18).

Over-appropriation

A common statement made regarding the
Colorado River is that it is over-appropriated. As
was previously mentioned, Utah currently utilizes
825,000 acre feet of the state's entitlement, leaving
some 600,000 acre feet available. According to
state officials this amount is sufficient to meet the
forseeable domestic demand of the state (Lawrence
and Saunders, 1975). Problems arise, however, if
additional quantities will be demanded for .
agriculture and energy development.
The State Engineer has approved filings
totaling just under 600,000 acre feet from the
remaining amount of the state's allotment. These
fllings, if proved, could by themselves exhaust the
entire entitlement (Hansen, 1975). The majority of
this remaining water is covered by an approved
application, in the name of the Bureau of
Reclamation, for the Central Utah Project. That
flow which remains is associated with approved
applications in the lower reaches of the basin and
along major tributaries of the Colorado River.

Once the water is placed to beneficial use, the
applicant submits proof of his actions and is issued
a certificate of appropriation, which is filed in
the ' State. Engineer's office. Domestic purposes,
stockwater, irrigation, municipal power, manufacturing, fish culture, and the use of navigable water
for the recovery of salt and the minerals have all
been classified as beneficial use of state waters.
A certificate of appropriation constitutes
prima facie evidence of the water right. The right
consists not only in the amount of the appropriation but also in the priority. It also extends to
quality as well as quantity. A water right is
considered as a species of real property and is
protected as such. It is a usufructuary right,
meaning the right to divert from the source of
supply. Lastly, a water right in Utah is separate
and distinct from the land upon which it is used.

It is obvious, therefore, that Utah is currently
utilizing or has commitments for using the entire
1.4 maf to which the state is entitled.
Indian water rights

The Supreme Court, in 1908, held that when
Indian reservations were established, sufficient
water to supply all Indian lands was also reserved.
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The Wlnten Doctrine interpretation discussed
below, has made the Indians an important element
in any plans to develop Utah's remaining water.

be converted to uses other than agricultural, with
the understanding that the total water to be used by
the Indians will not exceed the equivalent of 4.0
acre-feet per acre for the acreage from which the
water is converted (USBR, 1973).

The case of Wlnten VI. United States is
generally thought to be the real beginning of the
reservation doctrine, an item which will be
discussed at greater length later in this section. The
essential point of the Winters decision is that
waters set aside as belonging to the Indian
reservations are superior to other subsequent
appropriators who obtained their rights under state
law, even though the Indians had not yet placed
their waters to a beneficial use (Hansen, 1975). The
justification for the Winters decision is not clear.
Some viewpoints, however, reflect the idea that the
motive behind the action was to provide the Indians
with the potential of rebuilding their lives after the
westward migration had . destroyed their previous
livelihood (Hansen, 1975).

Since the execution of these agreements there
have been considerable delays in the full development of the Central Utah Project. Congress has
failed to appropriate funds and inflation has forced
alterations in original plans. These delays have led
to a general dissatisfaction by the Indians with the
proposed development of their water rights,
resulting in suits being filed to halt construction of
the CUP until the Indian rights are guaranteed.
At the present time 129,201 acres of Ute and
Ouray Reservation land are claimed and determined to be arable under the Wlnten Doctrine. If
a water requirement of 3 acre-feet per acre is
assumed, the Ute tribe's rights to undeveloped
Upper Colorado River Basin water would be
387,000 acre feet per year (Lewis, 1975). Thus, the
Indians will be a major component in any future
plans to develop the state's remaining water.

One major problem with rights as defined
under the Wlnten Doctrine is quantifying those
rights. If all the land belonging to the Indians were
to be assessed as arable, the water requirements
would more than exhaust the remaining Colorado
River ~llotment in Utah. Furthermore, negotiations with Indian representatives have seen these
water demands continually reevaluated upward.

Salinity

Salinity problems arise because all water
developments produce increases in salinity concentration. Public law 92-500 (Federal Pollution Act
Amendments of 1972) implies that salinity levels
should be maintained at or below 1972 levels
(Lawrence and Saunders, 1975). There are
essentially two ways of preventing salt buildup:
take out the salt, or restrict further water use.
Desalinization is costly, and restricting further .
water use would essentially mean a moratorium on
any development. Extensive work is being done on
the salinity problem of the Colorado River.
Nonetheless, any development on the river cannot
proceed without consideration of the salt problem.

A second problem area is a legal one; whether
the Wlnten Doctrine intended the reserved water
to be utilized for other than agricultural-related
purposes. There has been no definitive answer to
the question by the courts as yet and so the issue
will remain moot until resolved.
The Indians have been involved in most recent
water developments in the Colorado River Basin.
Specifically, they have been guaranteed water in
the new Central Utah Project (CUP). In 1965, a
contract was executed between the United States
(Bureau of Reclamation and Bureau of Indian
Affairs), the Ute Indian Tribe, and the Central
Utah Water Conservancy District, in which the
non-Indian parties recognized 36,450 acres of
Indian lands as being served or to be served from
the Duchesne River. For their part, the Indians
agreed to defer development of 15,242 acres of
non-irrigated land (USBR, 1973). This particular
agreement related only to the Bonneville Unit of
the CUP, however. Similar deferrals should be
executed for the Upalco and Uintah Units of the
CUP totaling 13,876 acres. Thus, the Ute Indians
would defer irrigation to a total of 29,118 acres of
land (USBR, 1973).

Federal water rights-the
reservation doctrine
The reservation doctrine is based on the
premise that since all of the land now occupied by
the western states once belonged to the federal
government, the western states did not acquire title
to the public lands once they were admitted to the
union. Therefore, the federal government still
retains ownership of these federally-retained lands.
These claims extend to the right to dispose of and
regulate the public lands and waters in accordance
with the Property Clause of the Constitution
(Hansen, 1975).

The key point in these actions is that the water
use has been deferred, not abandoned. The
agreement provides that Indian water supplies may

In answer to those who claim that the federal
government relinquished control of these water
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Until very recently it appeared that agriculture
would be the only major water user in the Colorado
River system in Utah. To utilize the state's full
allotment vast exports of water to the Bonneville
Basin were contemplated. Potential new water
uses, especially those related to energy, have
permanently altered that view.

rights with the Act of 1866, 1870, and the Desert
Land Act of 1877, the federal government claims
that control was only deferred to the western states,
but ownership remained in the hands of the federal
government (Hansen, 1975). Therefore, when the
government reserved a part of the public domain
for its own purposes, it also reserved sufficient
water to facilitate these purposes.

It is the view in the State Engineer's office that
there are only two possibilities open to agriculture,
since it is the use which will find it most difficult
competing on the open market for sufficient water.
First, the possibility exists that increases in
demand for agricultural products will cause food
prices to rise giving farmers sufficient incentive and
purchasing power to compete with other demands
for water on the open market. Second, a public
desire to preserve agriculture could prompt action
by the state legislature, to prevent the transfer of
water from agriculture to other uses (Hansen,
1975). Such an action would maintain the
agricultural base and would essentially prohibit
agricultural water rights from being allocated in
the free market.

The beginning of the reservation doctrine is
generally associated with the Wlnten Doctrine
mentioned earlier in conjunction with Indian
rights. However, subsequent cases indicate that the
reservation doctrine may also apply to other water
withdrawals.
The key problem with water rights claimed
under the reservation doctrine is again one of no
clearly defined amounts or purposes. The possibility of conflict between states and the federal
government is always present since the watershed
on which most of the streams and rivers originate in
Utah and the other western states is federal land.
Efforts have been made in Congress to
quantify the amount of water which would be
classified as belonging to the federal government
under the reservation doctrine. Until such time as
the law is clarified there will always exist the
possibility that presently allocated water would be
subject to potential federal demands.
Potential water uses

At the present time agricultural producers .
seem to be ambivalent about such an action. Many
are concerned that water will not continue to be
available for agricultural production. At the same
time, however, farmers also see the possibility of
selling their water rights at a high price to some
industrial operation and using the income for
retirement or for investment in some other
business. Consequently they do not wish to see
public action which would preclude this possibility.

agriculture

The portion of the Upper Colorado River
Basin located in Utah contains over one million
acres of arable land. The 1965 Upper Colorado
Region Framework Study sponsored by the Water
Resources Council indicated that 307,600 acres
were under irrigation. Of this portion, 125,000
acres did not receive full irrigation requirements.
(A full amount is defined by the ' study as water
sufficient to satisfy consumptive use as calculated
by the Blaney-Criddle method.) (Lawrence and
Saunders, 1975.)

Although new inbasin irrigation could conceivably consume vast amounts of water, committed agricultural water, which in this case means
the Bonneville, Uintah, Upalco, and Jensen units
of the Central Utah Project, will provide only about
108,000 acre feet for agriculture (Lawrence and
Saunders, 1975).
Energy

Energy related water uses are generally
associated with four principal activities: oil shale,
thermal-electric power generation, conventional
coal mining, and coal gasification and liquefaction.
Because of the nature of the energy shortage and
the slow development of solar and nuclear power
plants, the use of coal and other fossil fuels is
approaching a crash status. In light of this
situation the coal and oil shale reserves of Eastern
Utah are of particular importance.

The majority of the area's agricultural water
rights are located along the Duchesne River in the
Uintah Basin. Beef, grade A dairying, and sheep
are the main enterprises. The principal crops are
related to the livestock industry, and in order of
greatest acreage are alfalfa, pasture, barley, corn,
silage, wheat, and oats. Livestock grazing is
permitted on National Forest lands and the grazing
districts of the Bureau of Land Management. The
growing season is too short for most cash crops and
precipitation is inadequate for dry farming
(Skogerboe and Austin, 1967).

The water requirements for coal mining are
small, and often sufficient water is developed in the
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mine itself to meet mmmg needs. Electric
generating plants consume about 15,000 acre feet
of water annually per 1,000 megawatts of capacity.
The majority of the water is used for cooling
purposes. At the moment only about 7,800 acre
feet annually are being used for thermal power
generation, but at least four large thermal plants
are in various stages of development. The
associated water requirements would be about
120,000 acre feet annually to supply an additional
8,000 megawatts of capacity (Lawrence and
Saunders, 1975).

Environmental agitation for the preservation
of the natural environment of the Upper Colorado
River Basin has had considerable impact. Recent
political developments in the State of Colorado, for
example, have delayed some energy development
projects in that state. Finally there are some
proposals to designate many of the energy-related
waterways in Utah as wilderness areas. Such action
would completely eliminate development along
those rivers.

The water requirements, methods of delivery,
and uses of water for oil shale will be discussed in
depth in a later chapter. Basically, the projected
water needs for a 100,000 blsl day operation and a
support community of 8,000 people are estimated
at 36,000 acre feet annually (Lawrence and
Saunders, 1975).

It should be obvious from the preceding pages,
that the formulation of a state water policy which
reflects current water needs is of paramount
importance. Historically, the state, as represented
by the Board of Water. Resources and the State
Engineer, has supported and encouraged any water
development which did not injure other water
users. The guiding principle was first in filing, first
in right. This policy, however, has resulted in the
potential overallocation of virtually all of Utah's
streams and rivers. The problem is particularly
acute in the Upper Colorado River Basin. It is-now
apparent that the problem is no longer one of
getting the water developed, but of choosing
between competing and often conflicting uses.

Future water polley

Water for coal gasification and liquefaction is
estimated at 15,000 acre feet per year for a 250 M
cu ftlday operation (USDI, 1974). At the moment
the number of plants and their size is speCUlative,
although the amount of the state's coal deposits
indicates that the industry will be important to
Utah's -energy development plans.

The administrative problems in dealing with
the vast number of competing and conflicting water
filings have resulted in the Governor formally
declaring a moratorium on all water allocations in
the state. In reality such a situation has existed for
some time, especially in regards to the state's '
Colorado River water. As an example of the
magnitude of the problem, energy filings totaling
1.2 maf are on file for the Upper Colorado River
Basin alone (Hansen, 1975). This amount is nearly
equal to the state's entire Colorado River
allotment.

A problem, however, with all such experimental operations is that no large commercial
plants have been attempted and the water
estimates may be subject to considerable error.
WUdUfe and recreadon

Besides the water demands for agriculture,
energy, and industry, there is considerable pressure
to maintain streamflows for fishery, recreational,
and aesthetic purposes. Some federal legislation
including the Wilderness Act, Wild Horse and
Burro Act and recently the Endangered Species
Act, if interpreted literally, could stop all
development for any purposes along many energyrelated waterways. Section 7 of the Endangered
Species Act reads, speaking of federal involvement
in any way, " ... the actions shall not jeopardize the
continued existence of such endangered species
and threatened species or result in the destruction
or modification of habitat of such species which is
determined by the Secretary, after consultation as
appropriate with the affected States, to be critical"
(Phelps, 1975, p. 76). As an example of the
potential implications of these environmental
statutes, Utah's and Colorado's oil shale tracts may
be inhabited by five endangered species of
mammals and fish. The federal involvement in the
management of these tracts in leasing and
developing them could eliminate any action which
would alter in any way the natural habitat of these
species. In effect, the action would eliminate
development.

The job of developing a comprehensive water
policy will most likely incorporate two primary
concepts: attempting to obtain maximum usage of
presently approved water rights and formulating 'a
sound criteria for the allocation of presently nonallocated water. In both cases legislative attempts
have been made to clarify the problems. It is
apparent, however, that the courts will eventually
occupy a major role in delineating specific
guidelines.
DUlgence

It has been previously mentioned that
approved filings for the Upper Colorado River
Basin will exhaust the state's entitlement if all
those filings are fully developed. Delays in the full
utilization of such approved filings have brought
up the possibility that sufficient action may never
be taken to fully develop these rights.
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Historically, extensions of time for full
development have been granted as a matter of
course. Delays of 50 years are not uncommon.
The law states that "reasonable and due diligence"
will be shown in fully utilizing approved allocations. Obviously, this statement is subject to
wide interpretation. In the past if marginal effort
was shown in proving up on a right an extension
would be granted. The critical water situation,
however, dictates that such latitude may not be in
the best interests of current priorities.

a number of purposes, including energy-related
uses. How to deal with these fllings will be a major
issue in any water policy.
The situation was highlighted in the last
. legislative session, when a piece of legislation (S.B.
291) was introduced. The bill represented a radical
departure from the traditional allocation practices.
In essence it would have empowered the State
Engineer to decide, without respect to filing date,
which filings are most important to the public
welfare and, therefore, should be approved. It
appears that the primary purpose of the bill was to
legislate a ranking of priorities to guide future
water allocations. Such a legislative clarification
would obviously be easier and faster to obtain than
a judicial decision, although that latter route will
likely be explored. Although the bill was defeated,
it underscores the need in the minds of some people
to view future allocation of water in terms of
the apparent reality in increased scarcity.

The legislature attempted to come to grips
with the problem when on May 13, 1975, it passed
S.B. 290 which amended Section 73-3-12 of the
Utah Code. The act gives to the State Engineer the
power to strictly limit extensions of time and
requires proof as to the necessity of such
extensions. If proof of "reasonable and due
diligence" is not shown, the State Engineer,
following hearings, is empowered to lapse the
filings, thus returning the water to the state for
future allocation.

It appears that the current feeling among the
governing officials of the Board of Water Resources .
and the Governor is that water should be
developed, allocated, and managed by a basin-wide
entity, similar in scope to a conservancy district.
Ideally, and particularly in urbanized areas, water
allocations should be patterned after public
utilities: anyone can sign up for water delivery,
water is priced to cover 3U pply cost, and shortages
are shared equally (Lawrence and Saunders, 1975).

It is difficult to assess the impact of the statute
without allowing time for the administrative
process- to function. Nonetheless, a number of
filings, by some estimates up to 100,000 acre feet
will be lapsed.

Forfeiture
A second area of concern regarding already
allocated water is the issue of abandonment and
forfeiture. In this situation, water which has
already been allocated and developed is not being
utilized. The law specifically mentions the time
necessary to define abandonment and forfeiture.
Nonetheless, they are primarily judicial decisions
and technically difficult to define. Often only a
portion of a water right would be subject to such
action and this situation complicates the process.
Such efforts could, however, provide the state with
some new water to allocate to other potential uses.

As a general policy, public entities seldom
participate in water development projects without
actually holding title to the water. Since the
economic feasibility of such large undertakings is a
function of size, the operations naturally require
the allocations of significant amounts of water.
This situation has some interesting ramifications.
If large amounts of water are allocated to the state
to develop and distribute to individual users, the
state will soon occupy the role of water-broker.
Individual water rights will be difficult to obtain,
and the traditional role of State Engineer may be
altered. Obviously then, the state's own water
filings will be a significant element in defining a
water policy.

PrIority

The state has seldom departed from the policy
of first in filing, first in right, as the guideline for
allocating water. This process was adequate when
the majority of filings were for the same purposes,
namely agriculture. In light of the altered energy
picture and continued municipal demands, the
question naturally arises whether the use of the
filing date as the sole criterion for allocating water
is in the best interest of the public.

In those areas where the Board of Water
Resources is able to obtain rights or already holds
them, it has been petitioned by other potential
users to relinquish parts of those rights. In most
cases the Board will attempt to reach some type of
arrangement for granting a firm agreement for use
of the water in place of the actual water right. Such
might well be the case with energy demands.

There are currently on file with the State
Engineer literally hundreds of filings, the majority
of which are dated after 1950. These filings are for

In summary, it appears that definitive action
must be taken to reconcile the state's present water
allocations with future water demands. Utah is
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currently utilizing only a part of the state's
Colorado River allotment, yet on the books is very
nearly over-allocated. Efforts to eliminate abandoned, stale, and inactive water rights could
provide some additional water to meet foreseeable
demands. The quantification of Indian and federal
government rights would also provide a realistic
yardstick to evaluate the current water resources
available to the state. These rights should not continue to be hypothetically dealt with. Lastly, the
formulation of meaningful criteria to evaluate the
vast number of unapproved filings would allow the
state to make progress with that situation.

Because of the high costs involved in the
development of these prototype tracts, no single
company seemingly has the resources to finance the
operation independently. Rather, the approach has
been to form consortia composed of a number of
firms, generally major oil firms, to provide the
development expertise and necessary capital and
technology. As an example of the tremendous costs
involved, one company has estimated that
$200,000,000 will have to be spent before the first
drop of shale oil is produced in Utah (Utah
Division of Water Resources, 1975).

OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGY: WATER
NEEDS AND SOURCES
The extraction of oil from oil shale is not new.
The Indians of the Upper Colorado River Basin
often amazed settlers by showing them examples of
the area's burning rocks. In more contemporary
times, the extraction of a liquid fuel from shale has
been attempted in various ways. None of these
previous attempts, however, has approached the
magnitude now being contemplated for the oil
shale industry in Utah and Colorado.
Utah's oil shale deposits are located in the
Uintah Basin and those deposits with the greatest
percentage of oil per ton of shale are in eastern
Utah near the Colorado state line. Some estimates
indicate that 300 billion barrels of oil are contained
in these shale reserves (Utah Division of Water
Resources, 1975).
The lands which contain oil shale deposits are
owned by the federal government, by the State of
Utah, and by private individuals and corporations,
and comprise thousands of acres. Ten years ago the
State of Utah filed an application to the Bureau of
Land Management for In Lieu Selection Rights on
156,000 acres of federal land. It is expected that
title to these lands will pass to the state thereby
placing ownership of a substantial amount of these
oil shale lands under Utah's ownership.

The following pages present a brief description
of these consortia, the technology that will most
likely be utilized in mining and retorting oil shale,
some of the associated water requirements,
possibilities for obtaining this water, and some of
the problems that are to be expected.
The development flmu-Colony
Development Operation
Colony Development Operation, a joint
venture of Atlantic Richfield Company, Shell Oil
Company, Ashland Oil Inc., and Oil Shale Corp. ,
has operated a pilot plant to recover oil from shale
since 1971 in Colorado. It was thought that the
Colony group would be the first group to operate a
commercial plant. Their timetable had called for
commercial operation to begin near Rifle,
Colorado, by 1978. The rising cost of oil shale
prod uction coupled with an altered political
climate in Colorado which is oriented toward
environmental demands, however, forced the
Colony organization to indefinitely suspend its
project last year.
At the heart of the Colony operation is the
retorting method developed by the organization
known as Tosco II. Research on the Tosco II
method was conducted at the Denver Research
Institute for 10 years (1956-66) and under Colony
sponsorship a 24 toni day pilot plant in Colorado
has been utilized.
The Tosco process involves the feeding of
minus 1/2 inch crushed shale particles into a
horizontal rotating retort, where it is heated by
mixing with small hot ceramic balls. Shale oil
vapors are distilled off, removed, and condensed.
The cooled balls and spent shale are discharged
from the retort and screened to separate out the
balls, which are sent to a heater, reheated, and
recycled to the retort. The spent shale is cooled and
discharged to compacted waste piles. It normally
contains about 4 percent of carbonaceous "semicoke" coating on the particles of spent shale, as
discharged.

In an effort to determine the feasibility of
shale oil as an alternative to liquid petroleum, the
Department of the Interior, in 1974, invited bids
and awarded leases for prototype oil shale
development on tracts which are known as U a and
Ub, located adjacent to the White River. Under the
agreements of the lease the consortium of Phillips
Petroleum Company, Sun Oil Company, and Sohio
Petroleum Corporation, is required to make bonus
payments over a five-year period to the Department
of the Interior totaling $120,704,000 (Utah
Division of Water Resources, 1975).
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Paraho Development Corporation- White
River Shale on Corporation

MinIng
Except for some very recent developments in
in situ oil shale production, conventional room and
pillar mining is the method which is being
contemplated by most involved in the oil shale
planning. Open pit and strip mining may have
some economic advantages but invoke loud
environmental opposition to an industry already
sensitive to environmental issues. In addition, most
of the rich deposits lie beneath a heavy overburden
and are thus inaccessible from the surface.

Sohio Petroleum Company, heads a 17
company consortium known as Paraho Development Corporation, the parent company of Paraho
Oil Shale Demonstration, Inc., the operating
entity. This group has also operated a small pilot
plant at government facilities near Rifle, Colorado.
White River Shale Oil Corporation was
formed by three of the sponsoring members of
Paraho to develop the lease tracts in Utah. The
subsidiary company is currently gathering environmental data in Utah and making plans for
development.

Water requirements and sources
The experimental nature of any oil shale
venture means that much of the information
regarding cost, environmental impact and other
variables is subject to great speculation. The water
requirements for the industry fall into this same

The Paraho operation receives its name from
the retorting method employed by the consortium.
The Paraho process was originally developed by
John B. Jones, Jr., who was one of the engineers
involved in the original Bureau of Mines pilot
project at Anvil Points, Colorado, from 1945-SS.
After the project shut down, Jones continued his
work and development of the process in Brazil.

cate~ory.

. ·T6"e lastest estimates indicate that a daily
production of 100,000 barrels/day from Utah's
lease tracts will require at least 26,000 acre feet per
year. These same estimates, however, indicate that
it may be theoretically possible to lower the water
input to a minimum figure of 13,000 acre feet per
year. The additional water required by the higher
estimate is related to cooling and dust control
needs. An additional 4,000 acre feet are expected
to be needed to supply water for the proposed
on-site community, if one is built. The Division of
Water Resources of the State of Utah (197S) has
indicated that eventually 7S,OOO to 100,000 acre
feet of water may be needed to support the oil shale
industry if all leased lands go into production.

In "the Paraho process the material comes out
about the same size and shape as it goes in, lumps
which are up to 3 inches in diameter. It is
compacted in a stable land fill that can be covered
with the fine gravel not suitable for retort fuel.
The basic unit of the process is the kiln or
retort into which the shale is fed. A gas-air mixture
heats the shale, driving off the vapors which are
collected in the oil recovery unit. Carbon and low
BTU gas in the shale help fuel the process. This low
BTU gas can supply all the energy needs of the
process including generation of electricity. Another
by-product of the operation is anhydrous ammonia,
which has value as a fertilizer.

It is difficult to obtain precise information
about the water requirements for the individual
phases of the oil shale extraction and production
processes. Many of the technological advances are
closely guarded secrets; the details have not been
disclosed by the development firms. The experimental nature of the industry also makes it difficult
to obtain accurate estimates.

Although the two retorting methods have been
developed independently, some experts feel that a
combination of the Tosco II and Paraho processes
will yield the best results. The Tosco method has
the capability of utilizing small pieces of shale
which the Paraho method does not. The fine grains
of shale tend to clog the Paraho kiln. The Paraho
method, on the other hand, eliminates the need to
crush the larger chunks into small pieces required
in the Tosco operation.

Bingham Engineering, of Bountiful, Utah, the
engineering firm commissioned by the State of
Utah to investigate the possibility of the White
River Dam, has released the following water
estimates for the prototype oil shale plant:
Water Requirements
for Oil Shale Lease Tracts U a and Ub

In light of recent progress with the Paraho
process and the suspension of the Tosco/Colony·
operation, the Paraho process will probably be the
one employed for the first prototype plants in
Colorado and Utah.

Minimum Requirement
Process plant
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9,700 a.f.

Processed shale dust control,
irrigation and other
undefined uses. . . . . . . . . . . .. 1,600 a.f.
Seepage, evaporation and minor
losses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1,700 a.f.
Total Practical Minimum
Requirement ............... 13,000 a.f.

would have to be coupled with discontinued use of
other water. Thus, current water uses in that state
seem to restrict use of the White River.
In Utah a number of filings have been made
for use of the White River. At the moment none of
these filings has been approved. The most
important appears to be a 1965 application in the
name of the Utah Water and Power Board for
250,000 acre feet. Sohio Petroleum Company has
also filed for 36,500 acre feet in a 1972 application.

Maximum Requirement
Minimum requirement .......... 13,000 a.f.
Add: Raw water to 100% water
cooled process and utility
plants ................... 8,750 a.f.
Add: Raw water to augment cooling
and dust control needs
required by different retort
processes ................ 4,500 a.f.
Total Probable Maximum
Requirement. .............. 26,250 a.f.
(Bingham Engineering, 1976)

Although the State Engineer has not yet acted
upon these and other filings such action must be
taken before oil shale will be developed. Although
the State Water Board has a priority of seven years
over subsequent applications, it appears doubtful
that the entire 250,000 acre feet application will be
approved. Rather, some accommodation with other
energy demands will have to be reached. For
example, Sohio has petitioned the Utah Board of
Water Resources for an assignment of a portion of
the Water and Power Board's application. If the
necessary water, some 36,000 acre feet, could be
segregated for use on the 7,592 acres of leased oil
shale land, Sohio would withdraw its application.
Inasmuch as the Division of State Lands has an
enormous potential royalty from the oil shale lands,
and in view of the Indian lands situated on the
White River, extensive efforts have been made to
utilize the White River so as to satisfy both energy,
agricultural, and Indian rights and needs.

The most likely source of water for the oil
shale lands in Utah appears to be the White River,
which heads in western Colorado above Meeker
and is a tributary to the Green River. The
confluence with the Green is near Ouray, Utah,
about 26 miles south of Vernal. The average
annual flow of the White River at the Utah/
Colorado line is about 500,000 acre feet. Currently
the use of the White River is minimal. Colorado
uses about 40,000 acre feet for irrigation along the
river, and Utah uses a very small amount for lands
owned by the Ute Indian Tribe (Utah Division of
Water Resources, 1975).

Proposed water development plans

The most likely alternative for providing water
for oil shale development at the prototype tracts in
Utah is the construction of a dam on the White
River near Watson. Industry officials view the
construction of a dam as essential because it
eliminates uncertainty about an adequate water
supply. It is argued that such a storage project
would be necessary regardless of where the water
rights should come from, be it from presently
unused White River water, agricultural water, or
Indian water rights.

Because the river crosses state boundaries, the
potential for conflict exists. The Upper Basin
Compact limits uses of the waters in the Colorado
River system to a percentage basis, as discussed in
the last section, but does not specify from which
rivers or streams that percentage must be taken.
The White River's location is such that it may play
an important role in both Utah and Colorado
energy development. Obviously some type of
compact defining each state's rights to the river
would be desirable from a security standpoint.
Efforts have been made to obtain such an
agreement but results have not been forthcoming
and it is thought that such an arrangement might
take years to finalize. At the moment all parties are
proceeding with development plans on a unilateral
ba·sis.

The dam and the reservoir are viewed as a
multi-purpose operation. Not only would wat~r be
supplied for the oil shale tracts, but the dam would
provide flood protection, silt retention, and
recreational uses. Most important, the project
would provide storage for irrigation water to be
used on 13,000 acres of Indian lands. The Indian
involvement in the project is essential since under
the Winter'. Doctrine water must be made
available to all potentially irrigable acreage. Thus,
the Indian Tribe could lay claim to much of the
water of the White River without regard to other
water uses.

It should be pointed out, however, that
Colorado will probably not be able to use a great
amount of White River water and still meet its
downstream flow commitments to the lower basin.
Colorado is currently utilizing most of its Colorado
River allotment and any new use of the White River
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possibility exists that the State of Utah might be
asked to appropriate the money for the construction of the dam. Mr. Lawrence in essence stated
that the White River Dam should be examined on
its own merits without regard to the future of oil
shale.

Although the White River Dam appears to be
the most logical and likely alternative for obtaining
water for oil shale, the project would, nonetheless,
be an expensive undertaking. Originally construction costs were estimated at $7,000,000, but have
now escalated to $8,500,000. (Personal communication with Jay R. Bingham, Bingham Engineering
and Daniel F. Lawrence, Director, Utah Division
of Water Resources.) It is obvious that the financial
arrangements for the project are a major obstacle
in the construction of the dam .

The exact contractual arrangements for
financing the project and delivering the water have
not yet been made public, but officials have
indicated that some form of public financing is
likely. Rather than create a new organization
entity, financing would likely be carried out under
the Uintah Conservancy District since it involves
working with only one county. Funds would be
obtained in the form of revenue bonds with the
conservancy district floating the bonds to obtain
better interest rates. The exact price of water for oil
shale has not been decided, but discussions with
state and construction officials indicate that the
figure will likely fall between $25 and $35 per acre
foot.

Efforts to build the White River Dam without
the oil shale industry's participation appear
primarily geared toward satisfying the Indian
water needs. Indeed, regardless of whatever means
of financing the project is decided upon, the Indian
water rights will likely be heavily subsidized either
by oil shale or the state. The reasons for this action
are essentially political. The Ute and Ouray water
rights on the White River are not part of the
deferred water rights under which the Central
Utah Project operates. Nonetheless, they are water
rights which the Indian Tribe is entitled to develop.
Efforts to satisfy these rights could have a positive
effect on Indian participation with regard to the
remaining units of the Central Utah Project as well
as other water developments in Eastern Utah. It,
therefore, appears likely that about half of the
storage in the White River dam reservoir will be
Indian water. Various proposals would give the
Indians a third to a half equity in the reservoir. Mr.
Lawrence indicated that the possibility of obtaining
funding from the Four Corners Regional Council as
well as other sources for the funding of the Indian
involvement is being investigated. Nonetheless,
much of the impact of the White River Dam will be
to satisfy Indian demands to insure Indian
participation in other water development projects
(personal communication with Daniel F. Lawrence,
Director, Utah Division of Water Resources).

Another possibility would be to have the oil
shale consortium itself build the dam. Under the
terms of the lease agreements with the federal
government on the prototype tracts, the consortium
is entitled to investment credits in the fourth and
fifth years. Thus, it may elect to build the dam
itself and write the expenses off to these investment
credits.

In summary, no concrete proposals for the
development of the White River Dam have been
finalized as yet. Efforts are currently under way to
complete a memorandum of understanding between all the interested parties as well as a
commitment from the state, the conservancy
districts and the Indians to aid in the financing of
the preliminary studies to be done on the project.

Both of these previously mentioned possibilities incorporate the idea of a significant involvement by the oil shale industry in the construction of
the White River Dam. Indeed, the project's initial
focus was to provide water for oil shale. However,
because of the project's potential benefits for
groups other than those in oil shale, especially the
Ute and Ouray Indian Tribe, state officials indicate
a willingness to examine the feasibility of
constructing the White River Dam without oil
shale's participation. In an interview with Daniel
F. Lawrence, Chairman of the Utah Division of
Water Resources, he indicated that if the future of
oil shale were to grow more uncertain the

The role of oil shale is still cloudy, and
negotiations are currently under way by the
companies to obtain extensions of time with regard
to the investment schedule on which they must
prove up on their leases. Tosco and Moon Lake
Electric, an electric-power company with interests
in developing the area's coal deposits, have also
petitioned to be involved in the White River Dam
project. Their water needs must also be evaluated
with regard to the water capacity of the project. It
also appears likely that the State Engineer's office
will approve the petition to segregate a quantity of
the Utah Power Board's filing for development on
the White River. The original request was for the

Several financing alternatives have been
proposed. One possibility is to have construction
of the project handled under auspices of the Uintah
Basin Conservancy District and the Central Utah
Conservancy District, with the cooperation of the
Ute and Ouray Indian Tribe. Ownership would
remain with the state and oil shale, as well as other
users, would purchase the water as it is utilized.
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segregation of 36,000 acre feet. However, it is likely
that some 53,000 acre feet will be segregated for
energy-related development.

Officials once felt that work on the commercial plant may begin by 1977 and that by 1980 three
commercial units, two in Colorado and one in
Utah, could be in operation. However, the time
schedule for the entire project is currently under an
indefinite holding pattern. Whether it will even be
attempted is the subject of great speculation. If a
prototype plant is 'completed, there are no present
plans to extend capacity beyond a 100,000
barrell day limit.

According to Jay R. Bingham Engineering,
the firm contracted by the State Board of Water
Resources to survey the possibilities of the dam,
work is currently being completed on the
environmental impact study and test drilling for
the foundation is 50 percent completed.
Bingham also indicates that the dam may have
to be one of the first items built for the proposed oil
shale complex. Blowers necessary for the retort
have to be transported to the site. The most
economical method is to transport these blowers
intact. Since the weight of the blowers, approximately 700 tons, exceeds the capacity of all existing
bridges in the White River area, the dam would
have to be constructed first to provide a means of
transporting the heavy equipment. Because of this
situation and if all other aspects of the planning go
as scheduled, the engineering firm estimates that
the construction on the dam could begin within a
year and a half to two years.

POPULATION IMPACTS
The information in the last section on water
for oil shale indicates that the proposed White
River Dam could provide water for the prototype
operation without infringing upon existing agricultural water supplies. Domestic water supplies for
the increased popUlation associated with oil shale
growth may present some problems, however.
Although present plans indicate that some 4,000
additional acre feet will be requested to supply
municipal water, there are no guarantees that all or
any of the oil shale popUlation will locate on-site. If
a new town is not built existing communities will
have to absorb the popUlation growth. In that case,
will the communities be able to supply domestic
water without affecting the agricultural sector?

The construction of the proposed White River
Dam is symbolic of the major obstacle for a
commercial oil shale plant; astronomical costs. It is
estimated that the dam alone would cost
$8,500,000 and that the total costs for the entire
commercial module could approach $1.5 billion.
These costs must also be viewed in light of other
financial obligations besetting members of the
White River consortium. Sohio Petroleum, for
example, has an obligation ofS1 billion for its share
of the Alaska pipeline. It comes as no surprise then
that the White River Oil Shale Corporation is
attempting to shift some of this financial burden to
other investors.
.

I

,
I

It is the purpose of this section to examine the
population growth associated with the proposed oil
shale plant and the necessary water needed to
supply this population increase.

The economic feasibility of such mammoth
projects is closely tied to the market price for crude
oil. Exact figures are not available as to what oil
price would make oil shale feasible, but it is safe to
assume that the price is higher than the current
free market figure for crude.

It is important to distinguish between water
"demand" and "requirement." The term "requirement" implies a fixed need for water where the
quantity utilized is quite independent of the price
of water. Need is related to water-using technology,
to crop requirements in irrigation, or to the
popUlation using water. Demand, on the other
hand, is a specialized term utilized by economists
to express the relationship between quantity of
water used at various relative prices of water. One
measure of the degree of responsiveness of the
quantity demanded to changes in the relative price
of water is known as elasticity of demand.

The availability of funds and the sharply rising
costs of construction and equipment are also
clouding oil shale's future. To offset this problem
of lack of adequate venture capital, some groups
such as Colony Development, have attempted to
obtain long-term, low interest federal loans for
their projects. They've also attempted to receive
some form of guaranteed price support for
petroleum to insure an adequate return from an oil
shale operation. To date all such efforts have
proven unsuccessful but are no doubt continuing .

It is generally assumed that the demand for
domestic water is relatively inelastic; i.e., that there
is little alteration in water consumption as a result
of price changes. Empirical studies have indicated,
however, that the household demand for water is
indeed affected by price changes as well as other
factors. For example, Gardner and Schick (1964)
found the elasticity of demand for household water
to be -.77. People in communities with high prices
consumed less water per capita than people in
communities with low prices. As among 44

.
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new town is constructed, it would have to include
all the necessary facilities to attract the oil shale
work force.

northern Utah communities an increase in the
price of water of 10 percent was associated with a
per capita decrease in the quantity consumed of 7.7
percent. It was also discovered that uses such as
lawn and garden watering were particularly
responsive to rate changes. When municipal prices
are high, development of other water supply
sources becomes economically attractive, and
people find various ways to conserve water.

II

I

In light of the current status of oil shale
development in Utah, namely no immediate plans
for expansion beyond a 100,000 barrell day
capacity, population estimates have peen scaled
down. In a 1975 publication, Lewis (1975)
estimates that the total population increases
associated with oil shale development for the Utah
lease tracts will not exceed 13,780, with a final
commercial operational estimate of 12,535. If
plans for the unit begin in 1978, the increased
population will not become a factor until the fifth
year of 1983. The eighth year represents the high
point in population increase.

This response of consumption to price may be
important in establishing water use figures for such
communities as Vernal, Utah, where water has
generally been plentiful and cheap. Consumption
figures indicate that water use for domestic
purposes has been relatively high when compared
with national household consumption estimates.
Increases in the rates charged for water demanded
by municipal consumers may make more water
available for other uses.

The population figures presented by Lewis
indicate that the majority of the anticipated
population, assuming no new town is built, will
locate in the Vernal, Utah, and Rangely, Colorado,
areas. Duchesne and Roosevelt, located in
Duchesne County, Utah, would also receive an
increase in population, however.

The population increase connected with all
aspects of Utah's energy resources has been an area
which has attracted great public interest. Every
community located near untapped energy resources
anticipates the economic benefits associated with
such development. The majority of these communities also seem to be anticipating some of the
problems associated with this growth.

The figures indicate that Vernal would
anticipate a final population increase of 3,958,
Rangley an increase of 5,396, and Roosevelt and
Duchesne increases of 1,574 and 479 respectively.
Even if the new town is not built there will still be a
considerable on-site population. It is estimated
that 30 percent of the construction force and 10
percent of the operations force would live at or near
the construction site (Lewis, 1975).

Since the plant capacity estimated for the
prototype operation has continually fluctuated, it
has been difficult to establish what the exact
population increases will be. As recently as
November, 1974, in their task force report for
Project Independence prepared for the Federal
Energy Administration, the Department of the
Interior estimated that a 100,000 barrel/day
prototype operation would involve a total oil shale
population of 24,400 people by 1980. This same
study also estimated that accelerated development
would involve over 90,000 people by the year 2000
(USDI, 1974). Of course, these figures reflect the
belief that future oil shale development would far
surpass the prototype capacity of 100,000 barrels/
day at some later date.

If the new town is built, it will capture the
majority of oil shale population. Lewis (1975)
estimates that the town would have a final
population of 10,028 with an eighth year high of
11,024. Approximately 80 percent of the oil shale
population would locate in the new facility. The
remaining people would locate throughout the
Uintah Basin. Vernal and Rangely would capture
the great majority of this non-new town population.
Roosevelt and Duchesne's population increase
would be negligible.

Projecting the population distribution for the
oil shale population is also a difficult task. It was
originally thought that a majority of the population
would locate in the Ashley Valley-Vernal area with
the rest being disbursed throughout the Uintah
Basin. Subsequent studies, however, have indicated that Rangely, Colorado, located only 30 miles
from the proposed site, would absorb a large share.

Water needs
The Board of Water Resources has stated that
4,000 acre feet will be petitioned by the White
River Oil Shale Corporation to supply adequate
municipal water. This amount would be in addition
to 26,000 acre feet requested for industrial
requirements. If a consumption rate of .25 acre feet
per capita is used (this represents a rate of 225
gallons per capita per day and is the rate generally
used by the Project Independence Task Force
Report) there would be enough water to support a.

The possibility of a new town being constructed near the present town of Bonanza, Utah,
would eliminate the need for the oil shale population to locate in existing communities. If such a
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population of 16,000 people on-site. This is more
than is projected in the Lewis population estimates.

are located less than 40 miles from the proposed oil
shale site, and highway improvements could
shorten that distance, both in miles and in trip
time. Even if the new town is built, however, there
will still be a close association between the new
town and these two communities. A second
consideration is that the new town may not be of
permanent duration. It may exist only for the oil
shale ind ustry and once the shale is fully exploited
the need for the town may dis.a ppear. Since the
shale deposits are so extensive, however, the town
may last for a very long time. Whether the high cost
of the construction of the new town would offset
transportation costs to and from Vernal and
Rangely is debatable. Much depends on how long
the new town can be assumed to last and over what
period the capital co~ts can be amortized. One
thing is fairly obvious; U a and Ub are located in a
desolate desert without the natural geo-physical
features that would make a new town an attractive
place to live. There would have to be some real
incentive to make people want to locate there.

Using these same water consumption estimates and population figures for the population
distribution without the new town, the water
"requirements" for the Vernal area can be
indicated. (See Table 3.) The Vernal figures are the
only ones shown since that is the only Utah area
with a considerable projected population increase.
The same procedure would hold true for the other
areas, however. The population table indicates that
there will be a population increase of 4,010 in the
eighth year of development. Using the .25 acre foot
per capita consumption estimate the water
requirement for that population increase is
approximately 1,000 acre-feet of water.
One of the primary concerns of rural
communities located within the oil shale area is
that this additional water will be taken from
existing agricultural supplies. Although it will be
shown later in this report that there are a number
of potential sources of domestic water, for the sake
of argument, let it be assumed that all the
additional water would be withdrawn from
agriculture. How much agricultural land would be
affected?

Water sources for Duchesne
and Roosevelt

The information presented in the Lewis'
population estimates indicates that Vernal, Utah,
will capture the bulk of the oil shale popUlation to
locate in Utah. These same figures also indicate
that Roosevelt and Duchesne will receive a
relatively small popUlation increase. The following
section will examine in depth the sources and water
needs for the Vernal, Ashley Valley area. The water
sources for Roosevelt and Duchesne will be briefly
outlined here.

Using an annual irrigation diversion figure of
3.0 acre feet/acre, in the eighth year, which is the
high popUlation year, only approximately 335
acres would need to be removed from irrigation to
supply the needed increase in domestic water
needs. Thus, it would appear to require the
sacrifice of very little agricultural acreage to supply
the water for a significant population increase.
This statement ignores the fact that water quality
needs for domestic uses may not be satisfied
through the simple transfer of irrigation water to
municipal uses. Obviously some treatment of the
water would be required or an exchange arrangement reached where communities could substitute
the irrigation water for high quality water. Again,
it should be mentioned that this transfer situation
is hypothetical and there are still other ways to
obtain sufficient water without substantial direct
withdrawal from agricultural sources. These other
alternatives for the Vernal area will be discussed in
the next section.

Roosevelt, the larger of the two Duchesne
County communities, obtains its domestic water
from the following sources:
1.

Uriah Heaps Spring-piped from the
spring near Whiterocks. The spring is
Indian owned and has a capacity of 1,000
gallons per minute. (1614 acre feet/year).
The spring was the sole source for
Roosevelt culinary water until October
1975.

i

Hancock Cove Well--developed and
started to use in October 1975. Capacity
is placed at 1.2 cfs (864 acre feet/year).

3.

Campbell Well-the rights have been
cleared and development is anticipated by
1976. Preliminary estimates of capacity
indicate a rate of 4.5 cfs - (3240 acre feet/
year).

The newtown
Obviously, if a new town is built, a great deal
of the concern currently felt by existing communities aJJOut absorbing the oil shale population will be
alleviated. Whether the new town will in fact be
built is uncertain at present. Vernal and Rangely
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In short, current water supplies appear
adequate to satisfy the need$ of the projected
population increase if rights to the Duchesne River
are clarified. Without that, efforts would have to be
made to obtain water from Starvation Reservoir or
other sources which might have an effect on
agriculture if the community were to undergo
substantial popUlation increase. The population
figures in this study, however, assume the increase
from oil shale to be rather small.

The system now has two 500,000 gallon
storage tanks and will add a one million gallon
tank with the Campbell Well. Extensive remodeling and replacement of old lines has taken place
throughout the system resulting in a savings of
about one-third in water used. It is estimated that
the two wells will double the supply and that
present commitments will be adequate for a
population of 10,000 unless considerable waterusing industrial development takes place. That
prospect appears unlikely at present. Should
additional needs arise they will most likely be met
by additional wells. (Personal communication with
Larry Bagley, Roosevelt City Manager, and Leon
C. Michaelson, area coordinator, Cooperative
Extension Service, Utah State University.)
II

Upalco and Uintah Units of the
Central Utah Project

These two units of the Central Utah Project, if
completed, would provide more than enough water
to satisfy any substantial population increase. The
Uintah Unit would provide 52,000 acre feet of
municipal, industrial, and agricultural water to the
Roosevelt area. The project also includes water for
42,000 acres of Indian land. The Upalco unit
would be located near the center of Duchesne
County and would provide 20,500 acre feet of new
water for municipal, industrial, and agricultural
purposes (Central Utah Water Conservancy District, 1975).

In 1960, Duchesne City began a major water
system improvement program. The program
included the development of new wells, the
construction of a desander / chlorinator facility,
new transmission and supply lines, a reinforced
concrete reservoir and an entirely new distribution
system. In 1971, a new pump house, a steel storage
tank, and a high-level distribution system were
constructed to bring water from the lower
elevations of Duchesne to the "Blue Bench" area.

The future of the two units is far from certain,
however. Both projects appear to have a low
priority .behind already promised but as yet
uncomplt!ted water projects. In their favor is the
importance of satisfying Indian rights. It was
mentioned in an earlier section that the Indian
demands must be satisfied or further construction
on the Central Utah Project faces the possibility of
indefmite suspension. The development of the
Upalco and Uintah Units, therefore, may be
determined by what pressures can be brought to
bear by the Indians and industry.

The primary source of water for the community is six shallow wells located in the Murray
Springs area three and a half miles north of town.
Two additional wells have been recently completed
in the area. It is estimated that all eight wells
pumping simultaneously will produce 1,000 gals/
minute, or 2.23 cubic feet per second (1614 acre
feetl year) .
Other potential sources of water are two
springs on Rock Creek located 25 miles northwest
of the town, Starvation Reservoir, located three
miles from town, and the Duchesne River which
passes through Duchesne City. In 1905, the federal
government filed an application to appropriate 15
cfs from the Duchesne River for municipal
purposes. There is some controversy over the
application, however; the State Engineer's office
maintains that the water rights in question are
owned by the U. S. Bureau of Indian Affairs. Legal
action is pending to establish ownership of the
water (Valley Engineering, 1975).

Water sources for the Vernal-Ashley
VaIleyarea

The information presented in the last section
indicates that Vernal-Ashley Valley will be the area
of the State of Utah to realize the greatest direct
impacts from the prototype oil shale operation.
Even if all the needed water for the popUlation
increase associated with a 100,000 barrel/day
prototype plant were to come from agricultural
supplies it would only involve an amount sufficient
to irrigate some 300 acres. Nonetheless, if energy
development in the area were to be undertaken on a
large scale, that situation could easily change.

Legal action to establish title to the disputed
right on the Duchesne River appears imperative
for the community to develop an adequate future
water supply. The eight wells in the Murray
Springs area are sufficient to satisfy a population of
3,300 people at present consumption levels (Valley
Engineering, 1975). Improvements in storage
facilities would also eliminate existing storage
deficiencies.

The purpose of this section of the report is to
investigate the current water usage in the VemalAshley Valley area and to examine alternative
plans for obtaining water for agriculture and
municipal and industrial uses.
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Current water sources

From the Spring Box and the adjacent
sedimentation and chlorination works, the water
flows southward into Ashley Valley. Water lines
have been laid adjacent to the roads along section
boundaries. This system provides water service to
most of the developed areas in the upper Ashley
Valley. In the cities, the Vernal and Maeser water
systems provide water service to all developed areas

There are two public water systems that
currently operate within the boundaries of the
Ashley Valley. These are the Maeser and Ashley
Valley-Vernal systems. The supply source for both
systems is the Ashley Springs, located adjacent to
Ashley Creek nine miles north of Vernal.

Table 1. Gravity model distribution of population Impact among principal urban places In the Ulntah
Basin auumlng no new town Is constructed (Lewis, 1975).

Year

Cumulative
total population
impact

Duchesne a

Roosevelt a

Vern ala

Rangelya

At or
near site

Other parts of
Uintah Basin c

Commercial Stage
Phase I
5
6
7
8
9
10

4,538
6,218
8,277
13,780
11,310
10,902

152
206
277
485
419
412

500
678
911
1,595
1,376
1,354

1,257
1,704
2,290
4,010
3,461
3,405

1,713
2,324
3,121
5,466
4,718
4,614

688
994
1,265
1,536
770
545

227
311
414
689
566
545

Commercial Stage
Phase II
11-15
16-20

12,535
12,535

479
479

1,574
1,574

3,958
3.958

5,396
5,396

501
501

627
627

aGravity proportions for distribution
Duchesne
Roosevelt
Vernal
Rangely

of urban population
0.042
0.138
0.347
0.4 73

bBasic assumption for on-site population projections:
1. 30.0 percent of the construction force would live in the construction camp at or near the site.
2. 10.0 percent of the operations force would live at or near the site.
Cpive percent of total population impact is allocated to non-urban parts of the Uintah Basin.

Table 2. Gravity model distribution population Impact with new town (Lewis, 1975).
PopulatiQn
impact

New
town a

Duchesne b

Commercial Stage
Phase I
5
6
7
8
9
10

4,538
6,218
8,277
13,780
11,310
10,902

3,630
4,974
6,622
11,024
9,048
8,722

36
50
66
110
90
87

Commercial Stage
Phase II
11-15
16-20

12,535
12,535

10,028
10,028

100
100

Year

Vernalb

Rangelyb

Other parts of
Uintah Basin c

119
163
217
361
297
286

299
410
546
909
746
719

408
559
744
1,238
1,016
980

45
62
83
138
113
109

329
329

826
826

1,127
1,127

125
125

Roosevelt b

aBased on an 80.0 percent capture rate for the new town.
bGravity proportions for distribution of urban population outside "new town:"
Duchesne
0.042
Roosevelt
0.138
Rangely
0.473
cPive percent of population impact outside new town is allocated to non-urban parts of the Uintah Basin.
(fhe sum of individual population impacts may not equal total impact (column 2) due to rounding.}
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The present population served by the Springs
would include Vernal City, all of the area outside of
the Vernal City limits within Ashley Valley
connected to the system, the Maeser Water District
area (this is the northwest corner of Ashley Valley),
and the Jensen area. The following number of
connections currently exist on the total system (30
November 1975 estimate, Uintah County-Vernal
City Planning Commission, 1970):

within the respective communities. These two
systems are an integral part of the Ashley Valley
. system.
At the time the larger Ashley Valley system
was developed in 1961, most of the then existing
lines, including those in Maeser and Vernal, were
incorporated into the system. Under terms of the
agreement, Maeser Improvement District obtained
a one-eighth interest in the supply aqueduct,
headworks, and treatment facilities. The district is
still responsible fgr maintaining and administering
that part of the distribution system within its
boundaries. The remainder of the Ashley Valley
Water System is owned and maintained by Vernal
City.

I

I

1670 - Inside Vernal City
1620 - Outside Vernal City, but on the City's
system
460 - Maeser District area
120 - Jensen
Maeser sets its own rates which are comparable to
Vernal City's rates. For those outside of Vernal
City but on its system, the rates are approximately
double the rate charged inside the city.

Table 3. Water needed to support on shale population and potential agricultural acreage
affected bt the Vernal area 8IIuming no
new town Is conltructed.
Population
impact

Water a
needed

Acreageb
affected

Commercial Stage
Phase I
5
6
7
8
9
10

1,257
1,704
2,290
4,010
3,461
3,405

314.25
426.0
572.50
1002.5
865.25
851.25

104.75
142.0
190.8
334.2
288.4
283.75

Chm~ercial Stage
Phase II
11-15
16-20

3,958
3.958

989.50
989.50

329.8
329.8

Year

According to the Water and Sewer Plan for
Ulntah County prepared by Despain Planning
Associates in 1970, and the Vernal City records,
water rights held by Vernal City for water through
the line from Ashley Springs include:
1.

a.
b.
c.

aBased on estimate of .25 acre feet per capita.

d.

bBased upon estimate of 3.0 acre feet per acre.

Table 4. Water needed to Iupport on shale population and potential agricultural acreage
affected In the Vemal area BIIuming new
town Is CODltructed.
Population
impact

Water a
needed

Acreage b
affected

Commercial Stage
Phase I
5
6
7
8
9
10

299
410
546
909
746
719

74.75
102.5
136.5
227.25
186.5
179.75

24.9
34.16
45.5
75.75
62.16
59.9

Commercial Stage
Phase II
11-15
16-20

826
826

206.5
206.5

68.83
68.83

Year

Steinaker Reservoir storage which the city
exchanged for Ashley Springs water in the
amount of 1,400 acre feet divided as
follows:
750 a.f.-Vernal City in its own right.
200 a.f.-Transferred to Vernal City
by Naples Water Company.
lSO .a.f.-Transferred to Vernal City
by Ashley Water Company.
300 a.f.-Transferred to Vernal City
by Glines-Davis Water Company.

The water is available on a year-round
basis.

aBased on estimate of .25 acre feet per capita.
bBased on estimate of 3.0 acre feet per acre .
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2.

Ashley Central Irrigation Company Water
Stock (Mutual Irrigation Company) totaling approximately 4,112.95 acre feet.
This water is available year round.

3.

Ashley Upper Irrigation Company Water
Stock (Mutual Irrigation Company) which
is equal to approximately 34.30 acre feet
available year round.

4.

Ashley Valley Reservoir Company Water
Stock totaling approximately 503.52 acre
feet available year round.

5.

Diligence Rights Claim No. 1370, for 3.5
cfs (2529 acre feet/year) from Ashley
Springs on a year-round basis.

To Ashley Springs

MAESER
WATER
DISTRICT

JENSEN
WATER
DISTRICT
- - Water system owned by Vernal City.
but outside of the city limits
December 1975

Flpre3.
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6.

7.

Application to Appropriate Water for
Municipal Purposes No. 24219 (not yet
perfected) for 5 second feet (3600 acre
feet/year) from Ashley Springs for use
from October to April.

need to be repaired and improved and , if done;
water waste could be prevented.
Thus, it appears that high quality water
supplies are available for projected domestic uses.
The problem arises in acquiring the rights to use
that water. Agricultural rights presently encompass
the majority of the flow rights from Ashley Springs.
Therefore, a transfer of water from agricultural
uses to municipal uses would necessitate a transfer
of right.

Application to Appropriate Water for
Municipal Purposes No. 24341 (not yet
perfected) for 2,000 acre feet on a yearround basis from Ashley Springs by exchange from Ashley Creek and Trout
Creek Reservoir.

The Ma~ser District also holds rights to the
Ashley Springs water. These rights include some
200 acre feet of storage water in Steinaker
Reservoir used for exchange for water diverted into
the system from the springs for use during the
irrigation season and stock in the Ashley Upper ·
and Central Irrigation Companies amounting to
460 acre feet (Uintah County-Vernal City Planning
Commission, 1970).
Based upon the information presented above,
rights currently held by Vernal City and the Maeser
District provide access to 9,244 acre feet of water.
This total does not include amounts from the
unperfected rights. Also, the area may not have full
use of Diligence Right No. 1370 for 2,533 acre feet
since it is subject to other prior rights. Thus,
Ashley Valley has clear and unrestricted use to
6,710.77 acre feet.

According to the Vernal City Manager, steps
have already been taken to insure the transfer of
agricultural water used on land that has been or
would be taken out of agricultural production and
incorporated in the city for municipal purposes.
Vernal City presently requires water stock ownership to be transferred to the city for each water
connection added "where there exist water rights
attached to the property desiring to be served with
the new water connection." This water stock is
actually shares held in the various canal companies
which exist in the area referred to earlier in this
section.
The city pays $45 for the water stock required
for a culinary water connection. The fraction of a
share required to provide this water is different for
each individual irrigation company since a share in
one company does not involve the same amount of
water as in another company. The fractions
required are as follows:

The current population of Ashley Valley is
approximately 13,700. The basis for this estimate is
a housing study and actual housing count taken in
December 1974, and continually updated. Therefore, based on current population and water
figures, the residents of Asbley Valley have access
to .49 acre feet of water per capita. If the water for
Diligence Right No. 1370 is included, the figure
jumps to .69 acre feet per capita.

All these fractions have equal value in terms of acre
feet of water.

According to most sources, including local
community leadership, flow from the springs is
more than adequate to meet the needs of the area's
residents. At present use rates and water prices, the
springs alone would be able to supply triple the
demands of the current popUlation (USBR, 1973).
There are also indications that current use in the
valley is unusually high. In 1974, the average
annual consumption of water within the Vernal
City system was .49 acre feet per capita. Most
studies indicate a figure of .25 acre feet per capita
is indicative of national domestic water consumption patterns. The previous chapter's discussion on
the response of water use to price may suggest that
per capita use would decline in response to higher
water rates. Also, older parts of the water system

Whether or not this amount represents fair
compensation is a difficult matter to determine.
According to local officials the figure of $45 was
arrived at by a fair market value determination by
members of the Ashley Valley Water Users
Association. Discussions with local irrigation officials indicate that the amount reflects the current
prices which water shares are being sold for in the
area. However, the prices which energy developers
could pay for this water might be considerably
higher. The present holders of rights understand
this and translate it into an expectation that water
prices may rise. The evidence in this study,
however, is that this expectation may well be
. unfounded unless large-scale commerical operations begin.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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Ashley Central - 1I 20th share
Ashley Upper - 1/10th share
Ashley Valley Reservoir - 2-1/4th shares
Island Ditch Company - 1 share
Rock Point Canal Company - 1/8 th share

Another area of concern is obtaining adequate
rights for approved exchange purposes so that the
higher quality water from the Ashley Springs can .
be available for municipal and industrial uses.
Thus, plans call for the city to get rights for water
to be developed under the Jensen Reclamation
Project of the Central Utah Project. This is
discussed below.
The courts appear to be one avenue being
explored by both Vernal City and local agricultural
users to define water rights and powers of
communities to obtain these rights. There are a
number of cases pending before local and state
courts to define and settle various disputes over
water usage. Some even involve potential condemnation of water for public purposes in order to
supply domestic needs.
In summary, there appears to be excess water
from the Ashley Springs to supply the oil shale
population over and above the quantity supplied to
the existing agricultural sectors. Nonetheless, in
the event of continued population growth Vernal
City will have to take measures to insure that this
excess water is transferred to the city.

The Jensen Unit
The Jensen Unit (see map of Jensen Unit) will
provide additional irrigation water for the Jensen
area and augment municipal water supplies to the
Ashley Valley-Vernal City area. The unit was
scheduled for construction in 1974, but environmental and economic problems have hampered its
beginning. Most of these problems have now been
resolved, and on May 25, 1976, voters in the
Uintah Water Conservancy District overwhelmingly approved the $33,000,000 commitment to the
federal government to get construction on the unit
started.
The main features of the unit will be the
Tyzack Dam and Reservoir, Aqueduct, Pumping
Plant, and the Burns Pumping Plant. The dam and
reservoir will be located on Big Brush Creek
approximately 3 miles south from the Utah
Highway 44 crossing.
The unit will develop 4,700 acre feet of water
for irrigation purposes in the Jensen area, and
18,000 acre feet for municipal and industrial
purposes in the Ashley Valley area (USBR, 1973).
Plans call for the immediate purchase of 7,200
acre feet of municipal water by Vernal City with
additional purchases when needed. This 18,000
acre feet would provide the water to meet the
domestic demands of 38,000 additional persons at
a consumption rate of .49 acre feet per capita
(USBR, 1973).

The Central Utah Projectthe Vernal Unit
The Vernal Unit (see map of Vernal Unit)
provides irrigation and municipal water to Ashley
Valley and is essentially complete. The unit has
been supplying water to the valley for more than
ten years.
The
Steinaker
Diversion
Steinaker

by 12,000 acre feet per year as a result of the Vernal
Unit. This results from reservoir evaporation,
domestic use, and irrigation consumptive use.

major features of the unit are the
Dam and Reservoir, Fort Thornburgh
Dam, Steinaker Feeder Canal, and
Service Canal.

To transfer the municipal water from the
proposed reservoir to Vernal a four-mile buried
aqueduct will be constructed. The water would be
pumped over the ridge to the west of the reservoir
and then flow by gravity to Steinaker Reservoir.
The project will make the high quality water from
Ashley Springs currently used by irrigators
available to Vernal City in exchange for water
delivered to Steinaker Reservoir for irrigation
purposes.

Water is diverted from the Ashley Creek at
Fort Thornburgh Diversion Dam some two miles
west of Maeser and delivered to Steinaker
Reservoir by the feeder canal. The unit supplies
about 18,000 acre feet of water each year for
supplemental irrigation and about 1,600 acre feet
for municipal use. This water is used as exchange
water for flow from Ashley Springs. All water is
currently purchased and is presently being utilized
(USBR, 1973).

The exact repayment schedule for the project
has not been finally determined but discussions
with the Bureau of Reclamation officials indicate
the charges to municipal and industrial users will
approach $100 per acre foot. This amount will
cover operation and maintenance and interest
costs. Although few studies into the value of
agricultural water in the Uintah Basin have been
conducted, comparative data would indicate that
the value of agricultural water would be in the

The supplemental water supply firms up the
previous undependable supply, and in particular
late irrigation season water, to about 15,000 acres
of cultivated land. The 1,600 acre feet of municipal
water is sufficient to provide water for 3,300
persons at a consumption rate of .49 acre feet per
capita (USBR, 1973). The Green River is depleted
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industrial operation is in an area which is not
currently utilized for agricultural production, and
the municipal growth demands can be satisfied by
the existing communities. In other words, sufficient
supplies are available to satisfy existing and
projected demand at approximately current relative
prices for water.

neighborhood of $10 per acre foot . Vernal City
officials indicate that the transaction costs associated with obtaining agricultural water directly
without replacement water will make the buying of
Jensen Unit water, even at the price of $100 per
acre foot , necessary. Under terms of the agreement
all water obtained from the Jensen Unit will be
exchanged for water from Ashley Springs on a one
for one basis. The water from the Springs will
require very little treatment to meet domestic
quality standards and the exchange water will still
meet irrigation quality standards.

There are additional impediments to transfers
of water from agricultural uses to energy development. Defining water rights and transferring them
from agriculture to other uses involves substantial
transaction costs.

The future of the Jensen Unit was once very
cloudy, but it now appears that construction on the
unit will go ahead without major obstacles.
Conversations with state water officials indicate
that oil shale and other energy concerns provided
much of the impetus behind getting the project off
the ground.

It is the purpose of this section of the report to
present some of the institutional constraints which
make transfers of water on a purely economic basis
a costly operation . Water rights transfers are often
viewed as a simple exchange of property. Although
water rights are legally considered as a species of
real property and, therefore, transferable on the
market, in reality such transfers are subject to a
number of legal and institutional constraints.

In summary, it appears, on the surface at
least, that there is plenty of water to meet
additional demand due to oil shale population.
Even without the lensen Unit, Ashley Springs
would be able to provide this additional quantity.
This does not necessarily mean that there will be no
water given up by agriculture for municipal uses,
however. Agricultural production requires land as
well as water. As the population reaches out from
current city boundaries, agricultural land will be
taken out of production as a by-product of
annexation, etc. As the land goes, so will the water.
What is clear, however, is that no irrigated acreage
need be left without adequate irrigation water
because of development of the oil shale prototype
plant.

All water rights on a given stream or river are
closely integrated with each other. Any action
(including transfer) which injures any other right is
prohibited by law. Therefore, a right may be
transferred only so long as it does not affect other
integrated rights. In general, this may be a difficult
accomplishment.
Consider a typical situation:
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IMPACT OF OIL SHALE DEVELOPMENT
ON AGRICULTURE
There has been much speculation about the
impact energy development will have on existing
water uses in Eastern Utah and the energy-rich
West in general. Since the majority of the existing
water allocations are for agricultural purposes this
impact is generally thought of as a confrontation
between the demand for agricultural and energy
development uses. Concern has been expressed
that agriculture, being unable to compete with
energy as water shortages drive up prices, will sell
off its water to the higher paying use. In the long
run this situation is indeed possible if energy
development occurs on a large scale in the years
ahead. In such an eventuality, energy development
will use very large quantities of water.

Lam

X

---- 5 e fs

A ( 1st)

D3Cfs
2 efs - - -

Assume that stream X has a total flow of 20 cfs
in the main water course which is completely
allocated. User A has a right to divert 5 cfs for use
on his land, as illustrated in the diagram. Let us
suppose that irrigation efficiency is 60 percent.
Efficiency is defined as the quantity of water consumptively used as a percentage of the amount
diverted. Therefore, 3 cfs are consumptively used
on A's property by irrigation. The remaining 2 cfs

It has been shown earlier in this report,
however, that the prototype oil shale operation will
not seriously compete with the agricultural
economy for water. The location proposed for the
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become return flow to the stream. User B has an
inferior right to A for 4 cfs. The remaining flow of
the stream is utilized among other downstream
users. If an energy concern, or any other potential
buyer, were to buy A's right, how much water
would the buyer be entitled to?

There is a second legal question. Water rights
are granted so that water can be put to reasonable
and beneficial use. If it is shown that increased
irrigation efficiency results in a surplus of water
which is not being put to such a designated use, the
possibility exists that the amount of saved water
would revert back to the state to be reallocated
rather than being salable to other users by the
original individual water right holder. This is an
area of speculation, however, since there are no
immediate precedents to govern this decision.

Although B's right is inferior to A's, B's right
is protected against any action which would
damage his right. B's water right is dependent
upon A's return flow; therefore, if A were to
transfer his water right, he would only be able to
sell 3 cfs out of his total right of S cfs since the other
2 cfs are return flow upon which other rights are
dependent. The same situation exists for B in that
his return flow represents other downstream water
rights. In other words, the usual interpretation is
that only the consumptive use may be transferred.

It is possible that some ' statutory action
guaranteeing that such saved water is property of
the water right holder would enable him to sell off
the saved portion of his right. If so, an obvious
economic incentive would exist for the farmer to
increase irrigation efficiency.

Another possible deterrent to water transfers
from agriculture to energy involves irrigation
organizations. A major part of the irrigation in the
Uintah Basin is handled through mutual irrigation
companies. The members of these companies are
stockholders. Such stock provides each shareholder
with a given amount of irrigation water or a given '
percentage of the stream flow. The water right
itself, however, is held in the name of the company.
Most company bylaws prohibit the sale of stock for
use outside of the company or for non-agricultural
purposes without the unanimous consent of the
stockholders. Since unanimity is often difficult to
achieve, the question that arises is how might nonagricultural concerns obtain such water.

This hypothetical situation represents an
obstacle to water right transfers. The transaction
costs are essentially threefold in nature: the first is
the technical question of how much of a right is
legally transferable. The second problem is legal in
that every transfer is subject to protest and judicial
review. The third problem is economic-if problems one and two are solved without cost, the value
of 3 cfs in the new use must be worth more than the
S cfs diverted in the original use if transfer is to be
profitable to the original user.
Another frequently mentioned aspect regarding the availability of irrigation water for energy
uses is that of providing farmers with sufficient
economic incentive to increase the efficiency of
their irrigation practices so as to make more water
available. It is well known that flood irrigation, as
practiced in the Uintah Basin, is highly inefficient.
Therefore, if the farmer were to be rewarded for
increasing irrigation efficiency through installation
of sprinkler irrigation, for example, he would
ostensibly be able to sell the saved water to energy
demanders. As an example, if user A could
increase his irrigation efficiency to 7S percent, he
would need to divert only 4 cfs to get consumptive
use of 3 cfs and could thus sell the 1 cfs saved.

One alternative is for energy to buyout whole
farms, obtain the corresponding stock, and leave
the farms in agricultural production until a
majority of the stock is held by the energy
operation. When such a position is achieved the
majority portion of the stock held by the energy
developers could be severed from the other stock
held by the irrigation company. At least, the energy
developers would be in a strong bargaining
position. Again, there is no legal precedent to guide
such action. There is, of course, the option of
buying out all of the shareholders and then
transferring the water to industrial uses.

A more penetrating view of this example,
however, reveals that the problems cited above
remain. The first is the problem of return flow. No
matter what efforts are taken to increase the
efficiency of water use, the return flow figure may
not be altered if crop requirements require a given
consumptive use. This situation highlights the old
adage, "One man's inefficiency is another man's
water right." The Colorado River is fully utilized
before it runs into the Gulf of California and
increasing irrigation efficiency will not add to water
availability.

A final problem in obtaining agricultural
water rights concerns municipal zoning ordinances
which stipulate how agricultural water is to be used
once it leaves agricultural production. Such zoning
laws require that once the water leaves agricultural
prod uction the control of the water reverts to the
city. This situation applies only in areas under city
control, however. But as cities and towns anticipate
increased popUlation and expand their boundaries,
more agricultural land may find itself subject to
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Water use for the prototype plant is estimated
between 13,000 acre feet per year and 26,000 acre
feet per year. The difference between these
estimates is the amount of water that will be used
for dust control and cooling. If a new town is
developed the additional municipal water for the
projected popUlation of 10,028 (see Table 2) will
also have to be supplied by water near the
prototype site. Based upon a consumption rate of
.49 acre feet per capita (current Vernal City
consumption rate) the on-site popUlation will have
to be supplied with an additional 4,914 acre feet
per year. This consumption rate is very high,
however. Raising the price of water discussed
earlier, might lower this amount significantly. If a
consum ption rate of .25 acre feet per capita is
assumed (Project Independence estimates) the
domestic water estimates are lowered to 2,507 acre
feet per year. Thus, the prototype plant and a new
town of 10,028 would require a high estimate of
30,914 acre feet per year and a low estimate of
15,507 acre feet per year (see Tables 5 and 7).

municipal control as a means of obtaining the
water.
The previous pages have not meant to imply
that existing agricultural rights will never be taken
for energy development. On the contrary; if large
scale development should occur then water use in
agriculture may be reduced. In that case large
numbers of agricultural rights will be purchased
together to obtain the necessary water and avoid
legal entanglements. The proposed prototype oil
shale operation simply does not need enough water
to warrant piecing small individual water rights
together and facing the legal problems. This is
particularly true when the water for the operation is
available from other sources.
What then will be the impact of the proposed
prototype oil shale development of lease tracts U a
and Ub on the local agricultural production?
White River Oil Shale Corporation has stated
categorically that there will be no use of existing
agricultural rights for the prototype plant. All the
evidence that has been available seems to support
this claim. Efforts have been directed toward
obtaining water from sources that have not been
appropriated, such as the White River. It appears
that these efforts have succeeded and the proposed
dam will be built. The location of the lease tracts is
such that no existing agricultural production will
be affected.

A look at the water supply side reveals that the
36,000 acre feet currently proposed for segregation
from the White River Dam would more than supply.
the high estimate of 30,914 acre feet per year
(Tables 6 and 7). It should be mentioned, however,
that the proposed dam with its 118,000 acre feet of
storage will supply room for some expansion of the
prototype operation. (Note: At least 50,000 acre
feet will be designated for Indian rights.)

If anything, it appears that the proposed oil
shale development might well have a positive
impact on some areas of agriculture resources.
Industry, in its efforts to obtain the necessary water
from the Slate, appears willing to subsidize
agriculture. For example, the proposed White
River Dam, although built primarily to provide
water for oil shale, will ' in fact assist local
agriculture by making it possible to irrigate some
Indian land and by providing some flood control
protection.

At this time, it appears unlikely that a new
town will be built. Therefore, the popUlation
impact discussed earlier would have to be absorbed
by existing Uintah Basin communities . A look at
the projected population increases in Vernal,
Roosevelt, and Duchesne indicates an anticipated
popUlation increase for that area of 6,011 persons.
Utilizing the higher consumption rate of .49 acre
feet per capita this popUlation increase would
require some 3,253 acre feet per year. The lower
rate of .25 acre feet per capita projects a total of
1,661 acre feet per year. Examination of the water
supply side for this same area, however, reveals
that 40,195 acre feet per year may eventually be
available for municipal and industrial use in the
Uintah Basin (see Tables 6 and 7).

Population impacts, although significant, do
not appear to be substantial enough to involve
significant transfers of water from agriculture to
municipal uses. This is particularly true if water for
the Jensen Unit of the Central Utah Project is
developed .. Lastly, the legal and institutional
constraints to efforts by energy to buy up small
individual water rights on a piecemeal basis seem
to be quite costly.

In summary, the prototype oil shale operation
and the associated population increase will have no
apparent impact on the Uintah Basin agricultural
or municpal water supplies.

CONCLUSION
Of course, these estimates incorporate only the
impact of the prototype operation of a maximum
cap.acity of 100,000 barrels/day. If oil shale
operations were to become economically feasible,
water demands could expand rapidly. Other large

Investigation into the physical availability of
water in the oil shale area reveals that the prototype
oil shale plant will ~ve little impact on the Uintah
Basin's agricultural or municipal water supplies.
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upon Indian claims, providing additional water
supplies cannot be found.

energy developments, i.e., coal gasification and
liquefaction, could also expand quickly and
demand huge quantities of water. The question
then arises as to the capacities of existing water
supplies to support a large scale population
increase and further ind ustrial development.

Examination of the institutional and legal
framework of the appropriative doctrine in general
and of Utah water law specifically reveals that the
basic orientation of such laws is protective of
existing water rights. They are protected from
harm from other potential water users even though
a given water use may be more beneficial in an
economic sense.

Based on the low consumption rate of .25 acre
feet per capita the 40,195 acre feet available to the
Uintah Basin would support a population of over
150,000. The limiting factor, as far as water for oil
shale is concerned, appears to be the industrial
water from the White River Dam. If an additional
26,000 acre feet per year is required for each
100,000 barrel/day operation, the White River project would only be able to supply sufficient water
for a 200,000 barrell day industry before impinging

Although water rights are considered real
property statutorily and are transferable on the
open market, in reality transfers are restricted by
current laws unless the criterion of non-injury to
other water rights is met. The fundamental

Table 5. Water requirement demand summary for
the prototype 00 shale development at
various population assumptions.

Table 6. Water supply summary.
Prototype plant operation
(max. capacity 100,000

High Estimate Low Estimate
(a.f./yr)
(a.f./yr)
1. Proto,type oil shale plant
(max. capacity 100,000
barrels/day)

26,000

Vernal-Ashley Valley
(clear and unrestricted rights)

13,000

Subtotal

32,863

5,718

Duchesne
Murray Springs Area Wells

Totals:
1,940

990

5. Roosevelt
(no new town)
1,574

771

394

6. Duchesne
(no new town)
479

235

120

7. Other Uintah Basin
(no new town)
627

307

157

White River Dam and
Uintah Basin sources

76,195

Uintah Basin sources

40,195

Table 7. Summary comparison of total plant aDd
population water estimates and total
Ulntah Basin and White River Dam water
supply sources.
Req uiremen t/ Needs

Totals:
32,142

1. Total plant water
requirements and
total pop,ulation
water estimates

16,134

High
a.f./yr

32,142

Low
aJ./yr

Supply

16,134

Uintah Basin
sources40,195 a.f.

2. Total plant water

3,253

29,253

requirements and
new town water
30,914
estimates
3. Total plant water
requirements and
total estimated
Uintah Basin population water estimates (assume no
new town)
29,253

1,661

14,661

aAssumes .49 a.f. per capita
b

18,000

Roosevelt
Uriah Heap Springs, Hancock
Cove Well, Campbell Well

3. On-site population
(assumes new town)
10,028

Total estimated Utah
(Uintah Basin) water
requirement (assumes no
new town) (4,5,6,7)
Plant total and total Uintah
Ba~in population water
estimate (assumes no new
town) (1,4,5,6,7)

8,153

Future sources-Jensen Unit

2. Total estimated population increase (including
Rangely, Colorado)
12,535

Plant totals and total
population water
estimates (1,2)

6,711

Rights where title may be
under dispute

Population:

4. Vernal-Ashley Valley
(assumes no new town)
3,958

Proposed White River Dam
segregation of 36,000 a.f.
from total of 118,000 a.f.
storage

Assumes .25 a.f. per capita
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15,507
Uintah Basin
sources-and
White River Dam
76,195 a.f.
14,661

underpining of the appropriative doctrine is
preservation of the existing right at the expense of
later rights. The primary goal of the institutional
apparatus of the state (the water law and the office
of the State Engineer) is the maintenance of an
"equitable" distribution of this public resource.

If transaction costs were zero, if transfers were
made voluntarily, and if no external costs and
benefits were imposed on others, the free market
solution to the water allocation problem would in
reality conduce to maximum economic welfare.
Water would move to its highest value and
economic efficiency criteria would be satisfied. But
how about equity? It must be assumed that if a
farmer is receiving sufficient incentive to part with
his agricultural water in the market in a voluntary
transaction, that he prefers the transfer to
maintaining his right. Likewise, the energy
developer would be receiving the use of a resource
for which he had compensated the farmer.
Neither party can be considered to be worse off
and, therefore, the Pareto conditions for an
optimum are satisfied. This situation reflects the
basic free market belief that with the exception of
resource transactions involving externalities, the
market allocates resources on the most efficient
and equitable basis (Mishan, 1969).

Unfortunately, this desire for equity often
conflicts with efforts to maximize efficiency in
water use. It has been shown in this study that
although the value productivity of water used in
energy production is significantly higher than that
of water utilized in agriculture, efforts by energy to
bid water away from agriculture are often severely
restricted by current legal and institutional
restraints. Water may be kept in a less productive
use by the high transaction costs associated with
transferring water rights. Transfers must be
preceded by public hearings and the burden of
proof of non-injury to other right holders is on the
parties wishing the transfer. This often requires
technical information that is expensive to acquire.
Because of these transaction costs, oil shale
developers may well find it easier and less costly to
obtain the needed water from the state's supply of
unallocated water, at least for the prototype
development.

There would be some secondary economic
effects associated with any decline in agricultural
production in the proposed oil shale area, however.
Support industries such as equipment retailers,
fertilizer suppliers, transport and marketing firms, ·
would appear to be worse off if agriculture
declined. The area's economic position in general,
however, may not be negatively affected since
presumably oil shale development would bring with
it jobs, increased commerce and incomes, and
more tax revenue. Thus, other secondary businesses would gain and these gains would appear to
more than offset the losses to the auxiliary
agricultural industries.

It has not been the intention of this study to
imply that the preservation of existing agricultural
rights is of greater importance than obtaining
water for oil shale development. Rather, the
orientation has been to present the current legal
and institutional impediments to water right
transfers. Obviously, these restrictions are geared
toward preservation of already granted rights. A
question might arise, however, concerning the
impact on agriculture and other rights if such
restrictions did not exist or if the institutional
structure were modified te accommodate easier
transfer.

The conclusion of this study is that current
water laws and institutions will be an important
factor in determining how and if water will be
available for oil shale development. It has been
publicly stated by Utah's prototype oil shale
developers that the prototype operation will not
attempt to utilize existing agricultural water rights
or sources for the initial oil shale operation. This
position reflects the belief that the transaction costs
associated with obtaining this water are at the
moment too high when compared with the
possibility of obtaining water from other sources.
On the basis of this information, it appears that oil
shale development will not have any substantial
impact on the area's agriculture in a direct sense.
There is the possibility that popUlation increases
associated with oil shale will require the affected
communities to obtain the additional domestic
water from agricultural sources. Proper management coupled with efforts to define ownership of
the area's water sources should eliminate many of
the problems facing communities in obtaining the
needed municipal water. Lastly, long delayed

It is generally accepted that if agriculture were
stripped of the protection it now enjoys that it
would not be able to compete economically with
municipal and industrial demands. This is
particularly true with respect to energy operations
such as oil shale where the demand price for water
is quite high and the demand curve for water is
likely highly inelastic. Expenditures for water
constitute a very small proportion of the total costs
of producing oil from shale and no good substitutes
are available for water in such uses as soil
compaction and revegetation. This is tantamount
to arguing that the demand curve for water can be
expected to be highly inelastic. Thus, no one seems
to argue that oil shale producers could not bid
water away from agricultural users. In an economic
welfare context, however, would this necessarily
imply a reduction in social welfare?
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projects like the Jensen Unit of the Central Utah
Project would eliminate most of the problems
facing industry, municipalities, and agriculture in
finding adequate water.

manipulators prevent economically efficient
transfers.
Historically two methods have been employed
to ration resources. One is legislative and
administrative control. This is the method most
commonly utilized in water allocation in Utah
today. As a result, agricultural water has been
heavily subsidized at the expense of municipal and
industrial uses. This has been done by statute and
administrative procedures influencing how water
would be priced, assigned to land, and development costs distributed. The other method is market
allocation by price. What this study has pointed
out is that current controls exist to the point that
only rarely is there a free market for water
(Gardner and Fullerton, 1968).

Although there appears to be sufficient water
to meet agriculture and energy demands in the
Uintah Basin at the moment, the potential for
conflict underlies a fundamental inadequacy of
current water legislation, i.e., the inability of
current water controls to adapt to dynamic change
in water demand. Utah water law declares that all
water in the state is to be considered the property of
the public. This statement does not vest title to the
water in the state, but does stipulate that water is
community property available only upon compliance with the law. Water, however, is a fugitive
resource which is only of non-recreational value
when it is taken from its source and is used. The
role of institutional controls is ostensibly to
manipulate the system to obtain the greatest public
benefit. The system becomes onerous, however,
when laws and organizations created to be the

Hopefully as the fact is faced that water will
not be available for all potential competing uses,
water institutions can be modified to permit this
scarce resource to be allocated to uses and users of
greatest productivity and still protect the equity
positions held by current right holders.
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PART II
THE EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN THE
VARIABILITY OF WATER

INTRODUCTION

Before discussing these analyses, however, a
review of a portion of the recent literature on the
economics of uncertainty and a discussion of the
techniques of analysis in this area will be
presented. The purpose of this is to identify the
type of analysis to be used and to state the reasons
why this particular approach is used. The
techniques of analysis are presented so that they
can be referenced later.

In many cases irrigation water is a random
variable, i.e., its quantity is not known ahead of
time. In these cases a transfer of irrigation water to
an alternative use and/or an alternative drainage
can affect the variability of the remaining water
even though the average amount of remaining
water is unchanged. For example if a portion of a
stream flow water supply is diverted there are
several ways that this can affect the variability of
the remaining water. (1) The diversion of water
within the system will be different; thus the return
flow from diverted water will be different which can
cause a change in the seasonality and variability of
the water. (2) If originally a portion of the stream is
diverted and now water is transferred at a constant
rate, the remaining water will be more variable
even if its average amount is unchanged. (3) If a
water storage system is constructed on the stream
and a portion of the water is transferred the most
likely result would be a decrease in the variability
and a change in the seasonality of water. In this last
case, however, it is the storage facility that caused
the decrease in the variability of water not the
transfer.

A PARTIAL LITERATURE REVIEW
OF THE ECONOMICS OF
UNCERTAINTY

In the economics of uncertainty there are two
main alternative hypotheses concerning human
behavior. (1) It is hypothesized that individuals
maximize expected (average) utility or alternatively
(2) it is hypothesized that individuals maximize
utility where utility is a function of expected
(average) income or returns and risk. The proxy for
risk is almost always the variance of income or
returns. This second hypothesis is called the
mean-variance hypothesis. Frequently it is hypothesized that firms maximize expected profits. This,
however, is not an alternative hypothesis since it
can be shown to be contained within the first
hypothesis as a special case. The two main
hypotheses, however, are not equivalent. While for
a large number of analyses the conclusions are
identical, there are specific examples in the
literature where the conclusions of the two
approaches are different.

Both a change in the variability and in the
seasonality of water have been introduced.
However, the analysis will concentrate upon the
effects of a change in the variability since the
effects of change in seasonality have been analyzed
extensively. A change in the variability of irrigation
water can have an impact on local agriculture in
several ways. It can affect (1) both the variability
and average level of farm income (profits), (2) the
prices of land and water, (3) the quantity of
purchased inputs, and (4) the level of farm
production (output). These effects are analyzed
for the set of all affected farms. The analyses
will be carried out for both the case where the
farm 'managers are assumed to be risk indifferent
and the case when they are assumed to be risk
averters.

The contradiction between the two can be
viewed by examining some of the characteristics of
the two models. In the maximization of expected
utility analysis, it is hypothesized that utility is a
nondecreasing function of income, U = U(I), and
that the expected utility is maximized subject to the
constraint of the available alternatives. For
example, if x and yare two alternative sources of
income and they are both random variables then,
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E(U(x)) > E(U(y))

utility function is U(I) = log I , which is strictly
concave, then E(U(x» = 0.4 and E(U(y» = 1.02.
Thus under the expected utility hypothesis y is
preferred to x (Hanoch and Levy, 1969). In this
example the two hypotheses order these two
alternatives differently.

implies x is preferred to y. In the mean-variance
analysis, it is hypothesized that utility is a function
of expected (average) income, E(I), and the
variance of income (risk = oy2), U = U (E(I), oy2}.
In addition, for the variance held constant U is
assumed to be a nondecreasing function of
expected income (a U / aE >0). In this model utility
is maximized subject to the available alternatives.
For example, if x and yare two alternative sources
of income and they are both random variables then

The expected utility maximization hypothesis
is the more general of the two, is built upon an
axiomatic system of behavior under uncertainty
(Arrow, 1971), while the other is not, and offers
more promise for explaining human behavior. Thus
since the two do not agree, the contradiction is a
sign of a deficiency in the mean-variance approach.

U(E(x), a~ ) > U(E(y) , a~ )

With the demonstration in the literature that
there are problems associated with defining an
increase in the variance to be an increase in risk has
come an increased interest in alternative definitions
of an increase in risk. Rothschild and Stiglitz have
proposed three equivalent definitions (Rothschild
and Stiglitz, 1970). The random variable y is more
variable, or riskier or more uncertain than another
random variable x if:

implies x is preferred to y.
In both of t hese models the terms risk
aversion, risk neutrality, and risk preference are
used. A person is risk averse if over a set of choices
between a for sure alternative and a risky
alternative with equal means he always selects the
for sure alternative. He is risk netural if he is
indifferent between all such comparisons, and he is
risk preferent if he always selects the risky
alternative . These three definitions imply for the
expected utility hypothesis the following three
equivalent definitions. A risk averter is a person
with a concave utility function; a risk netural
individual is one with a linear utility function; and
a risk prefe rent person is one who has a convex
utility function. For the mean-variance hypothes.is
the original definitions are augmented to allow for
comparisons of two risky alternatives. A person is
risk averse if for all choices between two
alternatives with equal means he selects the one
with the lower variance (risk), and a person is risk
preferent if he always selects the one with the
higher risk. 1

1

100
E (x)

Var (x)

y

Pr(y)

0.80
0.20
20.8
1468

10
1000

0.99
0.01
19.9
9703

E (y)
Var (y)

2.

Every risk averter prefers x to y.

3.

y has more weight in its tails than x.

E(U(x»

~

E(U(y»

for all concave U than x is less risky than y. In
number three, "if x and y have density functions f
and g, and if g was obtained from f by taking some
of the probability weight from the center of f and
adding it to each tail of f in such a way as to leave
the mean unchanged" then y is more uncertain
than x (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970). This shift of
probability weight from the center to the tails is
called "a mean preserving spread."

Table 1. Distributions for x and y.
Pr(x)

y is equal to x plus noise.

In all three it is assumed that x and y have the same
mean. Number one says that y is distributed as x
plus z where z is a random variable (r.v.) with zero
mean. Number two says that if

We are now in a position to demonstrate the
contradiction between the two approaches. Let the
distributions of x and y be those given in Table 1.
In this example x has a higher mean and a lower
variance than y; therefore by the mean-variance
hypothesis, if the individual is risk ave. .·se, x is
preferred to y. However, if we suppose that the

x

1.

These three definitions give rise to a common
partial ordering of random variables or of their
cumulative density functions (c .d.f.'s). The ordering is a partial ordering since there are c.d.f.'s that
cannot be ordered by the three definitions.
However , if this happens for two random variables,
say x and y, then it is possible to fmd a risk averter
that prefers x to y and another risk averter that
prefers y to x. Thus it is ambiguous as to which is
the riskier of the two. The ordering given by the
variance is a complete ordering, and it orders the

IThe assumption that choices are transitive implies that the
definition of a risk neutral person does not need to be augmented.
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ambiguous case just described. These ambiguous
cases give rise to the cases discussed above where
the mean-variance analysis and the expected utility
analysis disagree.

all Xl and X2 in the domain of U and all t in the
open interval (0, 1) that

Letting t = 1/2 and noting that x = 1/2 Xl
X2 we get

RISK AVERTERS AND THE MEAN
PRESERVING SPREAD
To illustrate the effects of a mean preserving
spread upon a risk averter we examine a for sure
and a risky alternative. The for sure alternative is x
dollars and the risky alternative is Xl dollars with a
probability of 1/2 and X2 with a probability of 1/2,
with

Vex)

> .L V(x l ) +.L V (x 2 )
2

2

The same conclusions can be shown to hold for
more general cases using the appropriate tools.
Consider a family of cumulative distribution
functions F(x, r) where X is a random variable
defined over the interval [a, b] and r is a shift
parameter. The c.d.f. is assumed to be twice
continuously differentiable in both x and r. Let r2
be greater than rl' F(x,rz} is a mean preserving
spread of F(x, rJ means

x =.Lx
+.Lx
2 1 2 2
In this example we start with all of the probability
weight located at the center of the distribution.
One-half of the weight is then shifted to Xl and
one-half to X2 with Xl and X2 selected so that the
original mean is preserved.

f.

Let U(x) be the risk averter's utility function,
and assume that U(x) is strictly concave. The
expected level of utility for the for sure alternative
is

b

......... (1)

[F(x, r 2 ) - F(x , r l)] dx = 0

and

fa F(x,r2)-F(x, rl)dx~
Y

EF(V(x)) = Vex)

a~y~

0

... (2)

An alternative definition of c.d.f.'s that are "close"
to each other is

and for the risky alternative is
EG(V(x)) =

+ 1/2

f

.L V(x l ) +.L V(x 2 )

2
2
The problem is diagrammed in Figure 1. With all
of the weight at x the mean level of utility is U (X)
which is indicated by the point A. Then as weight is
shifted away from Y, values of the function above
and below x receive weight. For the example U(xJ
and U (xz) are weighted evenly. The effect of this
weighting is given by the point B. Since U(x) is
strictly concave this shifting of probability weight
to the tails caused the mean value of U to fall.
Similarly as the weight is shifted further and
further into the tails values of the function further
away from U (X) are given weight and the mean
value of U will fall still further. Thus the more
weight that is put into the tails holding the mean
level of x constant the riskier is the alternative and
the lower is the mean value of U. Consequently, the
more weight that there is in the tails the less
attractive the alternative is to a risk averter.

b

a

F rex , r) dx = 0

................. (la)

and
T(y,r)=

fYa

Fr(x, r)dx~

0

............... (2a)
U(x)

U(i)
1/2Ulx,)1

//~

/
B

+1/2U(X 2 )

/'1
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I

I
I
I
I

The conclusions that

I

I
I

v (x) > .L
V (x ) +.L V (x )
2
1
2
2
also follows directly from the definition of a strictly
concave function. U strictly concave means that for

Figure 1. E[U(I)] and U(E[I».
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which is generated by twice integrating by parts.
Since we are only comparing c.d.f.'s with the same
mean T(b, r) = T(a, r) = 0, and because F(a, r) =
o and F(b,r) = 1 for all r ,Fr(a,r) = Fr(b,r) = O.
Thus

where Fr(x, r) is the partial derivative of F with
respect to r. Equations land la insure .that mean
of x is unchanged by the change ill r, and
Equations 2 and 2a insure th~t as r is ~~creased
more weight is placed in the tatls. In addItIon, the
distribution F(x, rJ is said to be less risky than
F(x, r:z} if Equations land 2 hold. Thi~ is
symbolized as F(x, rJ ~I .F(x, rz} where ~I IS a
partial ordering.

Er =

~

f

-f

b

a U(x)F x(x , r 1) dx

U(x) Fx(x, r) dx

...... (3)

for every bounded concave function V . F x is the
partial derivative with respect to x and. i~ t~e
density function; thus when expected utlhty IS
higher for rl than r2, F(x, rJ ia less risky than
F(x, r:z}. Alternatively for "close" c.d.f. 's, the
partial ordering ~u indicates an increase in risk if,
and only if,

J

b

I

II

E

r

= aE(U(x)) =
ar

a

U(x) F (x r) dx
rx '

~0

a

T(x, r) U"(x) dx

. .. .... . ... (4)

To prove the reverse implication we prove that
for all U £'Il implies that T(x,r) ~ 0 for all x £
[a~ b]. This implication is proven by contradiction.
We assume the opposite and show that this implies
a contradiction. Assume T(x, r) < 0 at Xl which
since T(x, r) is continuous implies that there is some
neighborhood of Xl such that T(x, r) < O. Let this
neighborhood be (a?- (3) C [a, b]. Let 0 be an
element of'll and let V"(x) be .,given by the graph in
Figure 2. U is concave since U" (x) ~ O.for all x in
(a, b). Since O"(x) is zero for all x not in (a, (3),
only x's in (a, (3) are imll-octant in determining E r .
T(x , r) is negative and V "(x) nonpositive in (a, (3)
implying that Er is positive. This generates a
contradiction since the original supposition was for
Er~O ; hence, T(x, r) < 0 at Xl is impossible and
T(x, r) ~ 0 for all x £ [a, b].
E

b

a

b

which can be used to prove both implications in the
theorem. To prove the righthand implication note
that U £ 'Il implies that U"(x) ~ 0 for all x £ la, b]
and F(x,rJ ~IF(x,rz} implies that T(y, r) ~ 0 for all
y x [a,b]. These two together imply Er~ which by
Equation 3a means F(x, rJ ~u F(x, r:z}. This proves
the righthand implication of the theorem.

The partial ordering given by the set of all risk
averters is symbolized by ~u' With the mean of x
for rl and r2 equal, F(x, rJ is said to be less risky
than F(x, r:z} if every risk averter prefers rl to r2'
That is
F(x , r 1 )~.u F(x , r2 )

f

. (3a)

for every bounded concave function V.

~O

In this section the expected utility hypothesis
has been selected over the mean-variance hypothesis , and the method of a mean preserving spread
has been selected as the measure of increased risk.
Below the tools of this section, the definitions and
the theorem , are used to analyze in the context of
the expected utility hypothesis the effects of an
increase in the variability of water.

The partial orderings ~I and ~u are
equivalent. This equivalence is stated in the
following theorem:
Theorem l: Let (1) 'Il be the set of all bounded
concave, twice continuously differentiable utility
functions, (2) F be twice continuously differentiable
in x and r, and (3) ~u be defined over'll. Given (1),
(2), (3) then the partial orderings ~u and ~I are
identical, that is

O"(X)
F(x, r 1 )

~I

F(x, r 2 )

F(x, r 1 )

--

~u

F(x, r2 )

Proof: First
E

r

=/

a

b

U(x)Frx (x, r) dx
Q

a

= U(b) Fr(b, r) - U(a) Fr(a, r) - [UI(b) T(b , r)
- UI(a) T(a, r)]

f

+

b
a

T(x, r) U"(x) dx

Figure 2. Graph of V"(X).
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b

x

q. The c.d.f.'s for v and u are then given by

A CHANGE IN THE VARIABILITY
OF WATER CAUSED BY A
WATER TRANSFER

u

v+(1-7)q

G(v) =

When some portion of the water in a system is
transferred to another use and/or location the
possibility exists that the variability of the
remaining water will be changed. If the water
originally came from a stream flow system and the
water transfer is accompanied by the construction
of a reservoir, then the variability of the remaining
water can be expected to fall, if some portion of a
stream flow is transferred then the variability of the
remaining water can increase, decrease or remain
unchanged depending upon the rules of . the
transfer.

1
a

h(s) ds and F(u) =

f7
a

h(s) ds

with these definitions

Set) =

f

t
T

t+(1-7)q

a

h(s) ds +

J
a

h(s) ds

which is positive for t < t* = Tq and is negative for
t > t* = ril. To demonstrate this note that t<-rq
and 0 < T < 1 imply

!... < t + (1-7)q

A case where the variability is increased will be
identified. Let the water supply system be a stream
flow system with the flow (q) a random variable.
Originally the water was divided between two sets
of farmers, Sl and S2, with each set receiving a
portion of the flow. Let T be the portion going to S l'
The water supplies of S 1 and S2 were originally
random variables given by Tq and (1-T)q,
respectively. Let the farmers in S2 sell their water
and let the purchasers of this water receive the
mean amount that the S2 farmers were receiving
but let them receive it as a constant flow. Thus the
transfer is

7

which implies that Set) is positive. Set) negative for
t>rq is similarly demonstrated.
The conclusion of this section is that a transfer
of water that has the above characteristics will
cause the remaining water to become more variable
in the sense of a mean preserving spread.

THE ANALYSES OF THE EFFECTS OF
A CHANGE IN THE VARIABILITY
OF WATER

k = (1-7)q

In this section we examine the effects of a
change in variability of water upon several
important economic variables. The variability is
assumed to increase; however, the results are
symmetrical so that a decrease in variability will
have the opposite results. We study the impact of
the additional risk upon the farms in Sl' The
variable studies are the mean level of profits and
output, the quantity of purchased inputs, and the
prices of water and land.

where k is a constant and q is the mean level of the
stream flow. The water originally received by S 1
was
u = 7q

and it is now
v = q - (1-7) q

where u and v are both random variables. Let G(v)
and F(u) be the c.d.f.'s for v and u, respectively. G
can be shown to be a mean preserving spread of F;
thus v is more variable than u.

Case I: The farmen are risk neutral
Introduction
In this section we examine the effects of an
increase in risk upon the "aggregate" farm. That
is, the set offarms in Sl is treated as a risk neutral,
utility maximizing firm which is the same thing as a
profit-maximizing firm.

Given that u and v have the same mean a
sufficient condition for G to be a mean preserving
spread of F is (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970)
Set) = G(t) - F(t) ~ 0

The "aggregate" production function is
assumed to be real valued, concave and twice
continuously differentiable. Let it be

and
Set) = G(t) - F(t) ~ 0

............... (1.1)

To show that this relationship holds for G and F
defined above, let h(q) be the density function for

where y is output, Xl is purchased inputs, X2 is
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water and X3 is land. We assume that the land area
of the Sl farm is fixed so that we will be examining

g is assumed to be strictly concave. In the analysis,
X2 is a random variable. Let
x2 = (1 + s)ZO

where ZO is the mean quantity of water received by
the S 1 farmers and s is a random variable on the
interval [a, b] with a>-1 and the mean of s equal to
zero. Let the c.d.f. for s be

p

= Q::l
a

The aggregate profit function is written as

f s f(t , r) dt

F(s ,r) =

. . ....... (1.3)

a

where p is the output price, and WI is the price of
input Xl' The Sl farms are assumed to be price
takers. The expected level of profits can be written
as

where
Fs(s, r)

It can be shown that Equations 1.2a and 1.2b are ·
both strictly concave in Xl and X2 so that they satisfy
the restriction placed on Equation 1.2. If Equation
1.1a has constant returns to scale then the limit of
Equation LIb as p goes to zero is Equation 1. la;
however, since we do not restrict the sum of a, (3,
and y to equal one we do not restrict the
Cobb-Douglas case to be a special case of the CES
case. The relationship between p and the elasticity
of substitution , 0 , is given by

= f(s , r)

is the density function for s, and r is the shift
parameter for risk. Thus

E(1T) = P

~

b

g(x , ' (1 + s)zo) f(s , r) ds - WI XI
........... (1.4)

0=

f

a

b

s f(s , r) ds

for all r

With these suppositions the mean level of

X2

It is assumed that the farmers maximize this
function with respect to Xl' They choose the level of
purchased inputs (xJ that maximizes E. Note that
in this formulation only one decision is made for Xl
and that it is made before s is known. If s were
known before Xl was determined, the formulation
of the problem would be different .

is zoo

Below some of the analyses are carried out for
two specific production functions, the CobbDouglas and CES. For Cobb-Douglas g and g are
given, respectively, by
y

Before analyzing the effects of a change in the
variability of water we examine some of the
characteristics of E(n) . First, g continuous and
bounded for all feasible Xl and ZO implies that the
integral in Equation 1.4 exists. This integral gives
the expected value of output, y; therefore, the
expected value of y exists. This implies that the
expected value of profits exists. Second, g strictly
concave in Xl and X2 implies the E(y) is strictly
concave in Xl and Z. This , in turn, implies the E(n)
is strictly concave in Xl and Z. Thus the first order
condition is both necessary and sufficient for a
maximization of E(n).

= x a1x(3
x 'Y
23
with a + (3 + 'Y ~ 1 and a , (3, 'Y

>

0

. (1.1a)

and
y

= k x~ x~

with k

= x~'Y . .......... (1.2a)

For the CES production function gand g are given,
respectively by
]
R = [01 x P
+ 02 x2P + 03 x P
1
3

with 0 1 +0 2 +0 3

We now prove that g strictly concave implies
that E(y) is strictly concave. g strictly concave in Xl
and X2 implies

= 1 andp< 1

.. (LIb)

g[tx~ + ( l -t) x:·, (1 + s) (tzO + (1 - t) Zl.)]

+ 0 2 x P2 + C] liP
Y = [0 1 x P
1
with C = 0 3 xop
3

...... . .. (1.2b)

. ... .. . . . .. (1.5)
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for all XI O, Xl!, ZO, Zl in the domain of g and t £
(0, 1). Multiplying through by f(s, r) ~ 0 and
integrating over (a, b) with respect to s yields

Equation 1.7b is a rearrangement of Equation
1. 7a. The term in brackets in Equation 1. 7b is zero
by the first order condition for an extremum (see
below). Equation 1.7d is derived from Equation
1.7c by twice integrating by parts. In the equation
T(s, r) is the function defined in Equation 2a, and
is nonnegative. The production function is strictly
concave implying that gzz is negative; therefore,
Equation 1. 7d is negative as indicated above.

b

f(s, r) ds

+ (1 - t)

1 g[x~,

>t

f

b

a

a

(1 + s)zo] f(s, r) ds

The effects upon Xl' Now we analyze the effect
of an increase in the variability of water upon the
purchased input. This effect is analyzed using the
first order condition for a maximization of
Equation 1.4. This first order condition is

g[XII , (1 + S)ZI] f(s, r) ds ... (1.6)

Equation 1.6 satisfies the definition of a strictly
concave function, implying that E(y} is strictly
concave. The profit function is easily shown to be a
strictly concave function, and using the above
procedure its expected value can be shown to be a
strictly concave function.

=

+p

f

X~ [p

f

ll

1

. ............... (1.8a)

This condition says that at equilibrium the
mean level of the value of the marginal product is
equal to the input price. An increase in r will cause
E(gJ to fall if gl(XI, (1 + s)zO> is concave in s. This
conclusion is derived by applying Theorem 1. If
gl(XI, (1 + s)zO) is convex in s then E(gJ will rise as
r increases. If gl is neither concave nor convex then
there is insufficient information to determine the
change in E(gl}' The effect on Xl can be determined
with the aid of Figure 3. Let the price of Xl be WI O
and gl be concave in s. The curve labeled pE°(gJ is
for r = r Oand the one labeled pEI(gJ is for r = rl
with rl > rD. Thus as r increases from rO to rl E(gJ
decreases at each Xl causing the solution Xl to
decrease; consequently aXil ar = xr l < 0 for gl

b

[gl (Xl' (1 +s)zo)x: f(s, r)

a

g (x ,(l+s)zo)f(s,r)ds-w =0

or

An alternative way of generating this information is to differentiate the function for the solution
level of expected profits (E(~), the bar indicates
solution level) with respect to r. The result of this is

1

a

.......... (1.8)

The effects upon the expected level of profits.
We analyze first the effect of an increase in the
variability of water upon the mean level of profits.
The expected level of profits is a concave function
of s; therefore, by Theorem 1 an increase in the
variability of water will cause E(n} to decrease for
each level of Xl' The level of Xl probably will not
remain constant; however, since the entire function
will be lower than before, the maximum level of
expected profits will be lower.

E/rr) = p

J

b

aE =p
ax 1

b

gl (Xl' (1 +s)zo)f(s, r) ds - WI]

a

b

a

g(x 1 , (1 +s)zo)frCs, r) ds

=p

fa

.... . . (1. 7b)

b

=p

f

g(x l , (1 +s)zO) fr(s,r) ds .. (1. 7c)

b

a

2

g 2(X ,(1 +s)zo)zo T(s,r)ds
2

Figure 3. The effect of an Increase In risk for Ih
concave In I •

1

. . . . . . . . . . . (1. 7d)
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where

concave in s. For gl convex in s the conclusion is the
opposite.
These same conclusions can be generated by
differentiating the first order conditions with
respect to r and solving for xr 1. This yields

EYX2 is the elasticity of production with respect to
X2' All terms in Equation 1.12 except the last
parenthetical expression are positive; therefore that
last expression determines the sign of g221 .

. . (1. 9)

f

b

Examine the parenthetical expression. Let
gIl (Xl ' (1 +s)zo f(s, r) ds

a

A

The denominator is negative since g11 is negative
everywhere in the domain of g. Thus x r l has the
same sign as the numerator. Twice integrating the
numerator by parts yields

= ¢ (1-2p ) + p-1

where ¢

=

E

YX 2

• (1.13)

First note that CES is homogeneous of degree 1 in
Xl, x2, and X3 implying
1 = EYX + EYX + EYX3
I
2

N=

f

b

a

thus we seek the characteristics of A for

g221 (Xl ' (1+s)ZO)Z02 T(s, r) ds .(1.10)

0< ¢ <1

where T(s, r) is the function defined in Equation
2a). Since T(s, r) ~ 0 for all s£[a, b] and the square
of zO(z02) is positive, the sign of g221 determines the
sign ofN. If gl is concave in X2 then g221 ~ 0 for all
sda, b] and N ~ 0 which yields

and if gl is convex in X2 then g221
implying that

~

0 and N

~

and

p<1
Manipulations of Equation 1.13 show that A
and only if
a) for 0

0

<¢ <l

b) and for

In general xr 1 can be either negative ' or
positive; however, if the production function is
Cobb-Douglas or CES then xrl is restricted. For the
Cobb-Douglas production function g221 is negative
implying that x r l is negative. Differentiating
Equation lola yields
g221 =a{3(f3-1)X~-1 X~-2

xI .... ...... (1.11)

2

p

< -...!± <0
1-2 ¢

Table 2. The sign of Ir1 for the CES production
function.
O<¢<~

(1 -P ) XlP- I XP-2 R(lIP )-2
2

(Eyx (1-2p) + p-1)

l <¢ < 1

If a market for water exists and the farmers in
SI are price takers, then the price of water will be
equal to the average level of the value of the

For the CES production function g221 can be
either 'positive or negative; however with restrictions that appear to be reasonable for water, g221
. will be negative making xr l negative. Differentiating Equation 1.1 b yields
s:: s::
vI v 2

2

Condition a) fails since it implies that e is greater
than 1; therefore condition b) is the necessary and
sufficient condition for A to be positive. In b) EYX2
is greater than one-half and p is negative. The
condition p is negative is equivalent to the
condition that the elasticity of substitution is less
than one. Thus if either of these fail A, g221 and xr l
are all negative. If both of these hold, then
condition b) holds and xr l will be positive. This is
summarized in Table 2.

All of the terms in g221 are positive except {3 - 1,
which is negative because of the restrictions given
with Equation lola.

.g221 --

> 0 if

O<p<1
p<O

... . .... (1.12)

2
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~<¢<1

marginal product of water. Evaluating this at its
mean we have

An increase in r will cause the combined yield to
fall assuming that i is homogeneous of degree 1 in
all three inputs. The effect upon the return to water
or the price of water is in general indeterminant;
however, if i is Cobb-Douglas or CES with the
elasticity of substitution greater than one (0)1),
then the price will fall. The effect upon the price of
land is also in general indeterminant; however, if
the production function is Cobb-Douglas or CES
with the elasticity of production with respect to
water less than one-half, then the effect is negative.

The term W2X2 is the expenditure on water and py is
total revenues. Thus £YX2 is equal to waters share of
total receipts. The available evidence indicates that
this share is less than one half implying that if the
production function is CES it is reasonable to
expect xr 1 to be negative.

If the individual farmers in SI are price takers,
then the input prices will be equal to the expected
value of the marginal product. With i homogeneous of degree 1 the term profits used above is
nothing more than the combined return to water
and land, and expected profits the expected
combined return. Since an increase in r causes
expected profits to fall, it will cause the expected
combined return to fall.

The effect upon the mean level of output. The
question of whether the farmers increase or
decrease production when water becomes more
variable is analyzed next. The equation for the
mean level of production is
E(y) =

f

b

g(x l , (1 +s)zo) f(s , r) ds

a

... (1.14)
The effect of r upon the return to water can be
analyzed by examining the expected value of the
marginal product of water. This mean value is
given by

If Xl is treated as the solution level for the
maximization of Equation 1.4, then Equation 1.14
gives the expected level of the solution level of
output. Differentiating this solution level with
respect to r yields

E(VMPz) = p

fa

b

gz(x l , (l+s)zO f(s, r)ds
......... (1.16)

Differentiate Equation 1.16 with respect to r while
treating Xl as the solution level from the
maximization of Equation 1.4. The result of this is

=x~
+

fa

f

b

gl (Xl' (l+s)zO) f(s,r) ds

b
a

g(x 1 , (1+s)zo) f/s,r)ds .. (1.15)

Using Equation 1. 7c the second righthand term
can be shown to be negative. The integral in the
first righthand term is positive since the marginal
physical product is positive; thus this term has the
same sign as xr 1. If xr 1 is negative, then Er (J) is
negative; however if xr 1 is positive then ErG> is
indeterminant. ErG> will be negative if the
production function is Cobb-Douglas and if the
prod uction function is CES the sufficient conditions for ErG> to be negative are the same as those
for xr 1 and they are summarized in Table 2.

b

+

fa gz{xJI +s)zo) fr{s,r)d~

. (1.17)

In general the sign of the first term in braces is
indeterminant. The integral can have either sign
since the cross partial derivative glz can have either
sign and as identified above so can xr 1 have either
sign. The sign of the second integral is also
indeterminant in general since it depends upon the
concavity or convexity of gz. Thus in general there
is not much that can be said about the sign of
Equation 1.17. However if i is Cobb-Douglas the

The effects upon the prices of water and land.
We now analyze the effect of an increase in the
variability of water upon the combined return to
water and land and the return to each individually.
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sign is negative and if 'g is CES a sufficient
condition for Equation 1.17 to be negative is the
elasticity of substitution greater than on (0)1).
For the Cobb-Douglas production function xr l
is negative and glz is positive. The first term in
braces is, therefore, negative. Twice integrating by
parts the second term in braces yields
B=

f

b

a

gssz (Xl ,(1 +s)zO) T(s, r)ds

.... (1.18)

the term T(s,r) is defmed in Equation 2a and is
nonnegative; therefore, the sign of B depends upon
the sign of gssz' Differentiation of Equation 1.1a
yields
gssz = {32 ({3-1 )x~ (1 +s){3-2 z{3-1 x~'Y

.... (1.19)

All terms in Equation 1.19 are positive except
((J-1); thus gssz is negative for Cobb-Douglas
implying that B is negative. The term in braces in
Equation 1.17 is negative and p is positive;
therefore Equation 1.17 is negative for the
Cobb-Douglas production function.

1

"I

For the CES production function the sign of
xr l is determined by condition b) given above. The
cross partial derivative glZ is positive implying that
condition b) which is summarized in Table 2
determines the sign of the first term in braces in
Equation 1.17. To examine the second term using
Equation 1.18 differentiate Equation 1.1 b. The
result is

°

gssz = 2zrr l R(l Ip)-l (1+s)P-2 (I-p)(o 2 (l+s)z]P

p>~

d) and for 1/2 <¢ < 1

2¢-1

Condition d) fails since it implies that p is greater
than 1; therefore condition c) is the necessary and
.sufficient condition for C to be negative. In
condition c) p is negative (0<1) and £YX2 is less than
one-half. When both of these conditions hold C is
negative and gssz is positive. When either one of
these conditions fails C is positive and gssz is
negative. Table 3 summarizes these conclusions.
Return now to the examination of the sign of
Er(VMPz) in Equation 1.17. The second term in
braces which is called B in Equation 1.18 has the
sign of gssz' This sign is given in Table 3. The first
term in braces has the sign of xr I and its sign is
given in Table 2. An examination of these two
tables yields p greater than zero (0)1) as a
sufficient condition for Er (VMPz) to be negative.
For other conditions the sign is indeterminant.
The effect of r upon the return to land can be
analyzed by examining the expected value of the
marginal product ofland. This mean value is given
by

............. (1.22)

Treat Xl as the optimum Xl and differentiate
Equation 1.22 with respect to r. The result is
b

R-I_l) (02 [(l+s)Z]PR-I(l-2p)+p)

=02ZP-I

>0

Er(VMP\ ) = p

fa [x: g:

3

f(s, r) + ~ frC s, r)] ds

R(l/p)-l (1+sf-2 (l-p)(€yx -I)
2

(€yx (l-2p) +p)

............ (1.20)

2

f(s , r) ds +
All terms in Equation 1.20 are positive except the
last two parenthetical expressions. The . term
(£YX2-1) is negative and the last term can be either
positive or negative. To examine the last term let

c = ¢(1-2p) +p

where ¢ = €yx

•••

(1.21)

..... ... . . ... (1.23)

Table 3. The sign of Issz for CES production
function.

2

l<¢<l

Manipulations of Equation 1.21 for 0<<1><1 and
p<l yield C<O if and only if

2

O<p<1
c) for 0 < ¢ < 1/2

p<~<O
2¢-1

p<O

gssz < 0

gssz < 0
gssz < 0

general case were mostly indeterminant. That is, if
the only restriction that we place on the production
function is that it be strictly concave then the effect
upon only one variable is determinant. Fortunately,
it is the effect upon the most important variable
that is determinant. An increase in risk will cause
expected profits to fall. Thus an increase in risk
will harm the farmers. If the production function is
Cobb-Douglas then the effect on each of the
variables examined is determinant. In each case
the effect is negative. If the production function is
CE5 then the effects are determinant for certain
values of the parameters of the function.

In general the sign of Equation 1.23 is indeterminant. As with Equation 1.17 the signs of both terms
in braces are indeterminant in general. However, if
-g is Cobb-Douglas or CE5 with the elasticity of
production with respect to X2 less than one-half
then the sign is negative.
If the production function is Cobb-Douglas
the first term in braces is negative. The cross
partial derivative g13 is positive and xr 1 is negative.
The second term in braces is also negative. To
prove this integrate the term twice by parts. The
result is

The results of this section are summarized in
Table 4. In the table a minus sign indicates that the
sign of the partial derivative is negative. An I
indicates that the sign is indeterminant, and a
conditional statement with a sign indicates a
sufficient condition for the sign to hold.

D=

... . . . ........... (1.25)
The sign of this integral depends upon g223.
Differentiating Equation 1.1 a yields

Case D: The farmers are risk averse
In this section the set of farms in 51 is treated
as a risk averse, utility maximizing entity. It is
assumed that there exists an "aggregate"
production function that relates inputs to output
for the 51 set. The utility function which is
maximized is strictly concave since the group is
assumed to be risk averse. As above, when the
conclusions are indeterminant for the general case
the Cobb- Douglas and CE5 production functions
are analyzed to determine if answers exist for these
special cases. At some points in this section a
specific utility function is assumed. The utility
function has the property of constant risk aversion.

which is negative for the restrictions given with
Equation 1.1a; consequently, both terms in braces
in Equation 1.23 are negative. Er(VMPl) is,
therefore, negative since p is positive.
If the production function is CE5 the first
integral in Equation 1.23 is positive so the sign of
the first term in braces depends upon the sign of
xr l . Information about that sign is summarized in
Table 2. Now examine using Equation 1.25 the sign
of the second term in braces. The sign of this term
is determined by -g-223. This derivative is
g223

= 0 0 (l-p) X P-l
2

(€

3

3

The first problem analyzed in this section is
the effect of changing the assumption of risk

2 R(lIP)-2
xP2

YX 2 (l-2p)+p-l)

Table 4. Summary of the effects.

.......... (1.26)

The last term of Equation 1.26 determines the sign
of ~23 since the other terms are positive. The last
term is equal to A given in Equation 1.13. Above
the sign of A determined the sign of xr l . Here the
sign of A determines the sign of D in Equation 1.25
and, therefore determines the sign of the second
term in Equat ion 1.23. Thus A determines the sign
of both terms in Equation 1.23. Consequently the
sign of Er (VMP l) and the sign of xr 1 agree so that
Table 2 summarizes information about the sign of
both. As argued above it is reasonable to expect
(YX 2 to be less than one-half; thus, it is reasonable
to expect Er (VMPx~ to be negative.

Production Function
Concave
Cobb-Douglas

Variable

CES

+ if c
-ifaorb
+ if c
- if a or b

E/y)
Er(VMPz)

- if b

E (VMP )
r
3

- if a or b
+ifc

a) 0 <€

YX

< ~
2

b)O<p<l

Summary of Case I. In this section we have
analyzed the effect of an increase in risk upon
several important variables. The results for the
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The proof that Equation 2.S is strictly concave
in x is as follows.

neutrality to one of risk aversion. The other
problem analyzed is that of an increase in the
variability of water (risk). The impacts of these
changes upon profits, output, quantity demanded
of the purchased input, and the prices of land and
water are all analyzed. The impacts of both the
change from risk neutrality to risk aversion and for
an increase in the degree of risk aversion are
analyzed. In the latter of these the utility function
is assumed to exhibit constant risk aversion. This
utility function is also used in parts of the analysis
of an increase in the variability of water.

U(n) strictly concave means
U((1-t)n° + t7T»

for all nO, n in the domain of U and all 0<t<1.
n(x, p, w) concave in x means
A
7T (x,p,w)
~ (1-t) 7T (x°,p,w) + t 7T(X,p,W)

x= (1-t)xo + tx

Some preliminaries
It is assumed that the utility function,

U = U(7T)

(l-t) U(7TO) + t U(7T) . ... (2.6)

................ (2.7)

for all xO, x in the domain of g(x) and O~ t ~1. U (n)
a strictly monotone increasing function means

..................... (2.1)

. .................. (2.8)
is strictly monotone increasing, strictly concave,
. and thrice continuously differentiable. The utility
function that exhibits constant risk aversion will
have the property

8=-~
U (7T)

for

> nl. Combining Equations 2.7 and 2.8 yields

U(1T()2,p,W)) ~ U((1-t)1T(XO,p,w) + t 7T(X,p,W))

........... (2.9)

.................. (2.2)

Letting nO = n(xO, p, w) and n = n(x, p, w) and
combining Equations 2.6 and 2.9 yields

where 8 is the "degree of risk aversion" and is a
positive constant. This measure of risk aversion
was suggested independently by Pratt (1964) and
by Arrow (1963). Equation 2.2 is a second order
homogeneous linear differential equation which
has the general solution

U(7T(~p,W))~ U((1-t)7TO + t1T)

.................. (2.3)

or
U(7T(£p ,W)) > (1-t) U(7T(XO ,p,w)) + t U(7T(X,p,W))

where ~ and I/J are arbitrary constants of
integration. I/J is positive since U(n) is assumed to
be strictly monotone increasing, and ~ is also
positive since U(n) is assumed to be positive. The
magnitudes of ~ and I/J, however, do not affect the
expected utility maximization solutions; hence
their magnitudes are unimportant.

.......... (2.10)
which means that U is strictly concave in x.
Define

Let profits be given by
7T = 1T(X,p,W) = pg(x) - w'x

x

........... (2.4)

2

= (1 +s )z

and

where x is a vector of inputs, w is a vector of input
prices; g is the production function and p is the
output price. Given that g(x) is concave and that p
is positive, then n(x, p, w) is concave in x. This
follows from n being a positive linear combination
of concave functions. Combining Equations 2.1
and 2.4 yields
·U = U(7T(X,p,W))

n2

E(U) =

J

b

a

U(7T(X1 , (1 +s)z,p,w) f(s ,r)ds

where Xl and X2 are the only variable inputs. The
fact that U is strictly concave in x implies that E(U)
is also strictly concave in x. The proof of this is as
follows. U strictly concave in x implies
U(7TeXl ' (1 +s)Z',p,w)) > (1-t)U(1T(X~,(1 +s)zo ,p,w))

................. (2.S)

which is strictly concave in x.

+ t U(7T(X 1 ,(1 +s)z,p,w))
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where

2 I = (l-t)xoI + tx I

'2'= (l-t)zO + tz
for all XIO, Xl' ZO, z, and s in the domain of nand
O<t<1. Multiplying through by f(s,r) ~ 0 and
integrating over [a, b] with respect to s yields

fba U(1T(XI ' (1 +s),Z',p,w)) f(s ,r)ds > (1-t)
b

fa
+

U(1T(XO, (l+s)zo,p,w)) f(s,r)ds

tfa

the risk averse set than for the risk neutral set
depending upon the sign of the second partial
derivative g21' If g21 is positive (negative), then the
risk averse set uses less (more) Xl than does the risk
neutral set. The Cobb-Douglas and CES production functions, Equations 1.1a and 1.1b have g21
positive; thus if either of these production functions
hold, the change of assumption will lower the
quantity of the purchased input, Xl' The expected
level of output will increase when Xl does and
decrease when Xl does, since gl is positive. Thus if
g21 is positive (negative) then the expected level of
output will be less (more) for the risk averse set
than for the risk neutral set.
We now prove these conclusions. The function
to be maximized is the expected utility function

I

b

U(1T(X 1 , (l+s)z,p ,w)) f(s ,r)ds

... (2.11)
E(U) =

J

b

a

U(pg(x l , (1 +s)zo) - WI Xl) f(s,r)ds

thus E(U(n» is strictly concave in Xl and Z.2

............ (2.12)

The utility functions that will be examined in
the first order condition for a maximum of E(U) is
this section are strictly concave; thus the first order condition for a maximization of expected utility
will be both necessary and sufficient for a
aE(U) =
b U'(1T) (pg (x ,(1 +s)zo)-w )
maximum, since E(U(n» is strictly concave in the
ax
a
I
I
I
I
inputs.

f

f(s ,r)ds = 0

The effects of risk avenlon

. ........... (2.13)

or

We now examine the effect of changing the
assu mption of risk neutrality to risk aversion. We
analyze the effects upon expected profits first then
upon the quantity of the purchased input, the
expected level of output, and last upon the prices of
water and land. These analyses as those presented
above assume that land and the mean quantity of
water are constant.
.

E[U'(1T)' (pgI

-WI)]

= pE[U'(1T)gI]
-WI

E[U ' (1T)]

=0

or
p (E [U'(1T)] E [gl] + cov [U ' (1T ),g I])

The effect upon the expected level of profits.
Given t hat a risk averse set of Sl farmers uses a
different quantity of the purchased input than a
risk indifferent set, the expected level of profits will
be lower for the risk averse set than for the risk
indifferent set. This follows from the fact that the
risk indifferent set will maximize expected profits;
thus any movement away from their solution will
lower profits.

=

WI

E [U'(1T)]

or
p E [gl] =

WI -

p(COV [U'(1T),gI]) /

E [U'(1T)]

. ........... (2.13a)

The effects upon Xl and upon the expected
level of output. We examine now the effect upon

In this last expression U'(n) is positive; thus
E[U'(n)] is positive. The sign of the last term,
therefore, depends upon the sign of the covariance
between U'(n) and gl(1 . + s)zll). For the risk
neutral set U'(n) is a constant and the covariance is
zero. For this case Equation 2.13a becomes
Equation 1.8a as stated earlier. That is, the
maximization of expected profits is the same thing

the quantity of the purchased input and upon the
exp~ted level of output. The quantity of the
purchased input can be either larger or smaller for
2 ,

8 IDee Xl can be t reated as a vector, this proof holds for any
number of nonrandom variables.
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for risk aversion than for risk neutrality. The
reason for this is the change in Xl. The Xl in risk
aversion is smaller (larger) than the one in risk
neutrality if gZl is positive (negative) implying that
gz = gz (1 +s) is lower at each s causing E[gz] to be
lower under risk aversion than risk neutrality. If
the second righthand term is negative then W z is
lower for risk aversion; however, if that term is
positive, the effect of risk aversion is indeterminant. The effect of the two terms is opposite in sign
for this case. The second righthand term has the
same sign as the covariance term, and the
covariance is negative if Us' and gsz have opposite
signs. As noted above Us' is negative; therefore the
sign of the covariance is determined by gsz. If gsz is
positive then the covariance is negative and W z is
lower for risk aversion than risk neutrality.

as the maximization expected utility if the utility
function exhibits risk neutrality. A sufficient
condition for the cov[U'(n), gJ to be positive
(negative) is for Us' and gSl to have the same sign
(opposite signs) where
-

v' = aV'{7T) = V"{7T )p~ ZO
S

as

and

The utility function is strictly concave, implying
that U"(n) ~ O. This means that Us' ~ 0 for all s £
[a, b]. If gZl is positive as in Cobb-Douglas and
CES then the two have opposite signs and the
convariance is negative. If gZl is negative then the
two terms have the same sign and the covariance is
positive. Thus with gu negative and gZl positive
(negative) the solution Xl for the risk averse set is
less (greater) than the solution Xl for the risk
neutral set. With gZl positive (negative) pE[gJ> WI
«WI) which implies a smaller (larger) quantity of
Xl than does pE[gJ = WI which is the risk netural
solution.

The effect upon the price of water. We now
examine the effect of risk aversion upon the price of
water. Here we assume as we did above that the
mean quantity of water is constant, zo, and
examine the effects of risk aversion upon the price
of water. It is assumed that competition among the
Sl farmers for the water competes the price of
water, wz ' to a level such that

f ab U'(tr)(pgz - w. z) f(s,r)ds = 0

If the production function is Cobb-Douglas as
given by Equation l.la then gsz is positive and W z
is lower for risk aversion than for risk neutrality.
This derivative is given by
a
bSZ

=

p2
~

x a (I +s)~- 1 z~1

1

xa
3

....... (2.15)

which is clearly positive. However, if the produc-·
tion function is CES as given by Equation l.lb then
gsz can be either positive or negative. This
derivative is given by
gsz

= (\ R lIP-l zP-l{l +s1- 1[{l-p) €yx + p] . (2.1Sa)

•

2

The sign of the term in brackets determines the
sign of gsz since the rest of the expression is
positive. The bracketed term is positive for e > 0
(0)1) and is negative for some combinations of e
and £YXz for p<O (0<1). For p,<O and£yxz >0 the
bracket term is negative if

..... (2.14)

0<1 - €yx < 1

or

2

wZ =

and is positive if

pE [V'{7T )gz]

a> 1 - €yx 2

E [U'{7T)]

where
by

or
W

z = pE[gzl

+p{cOV[V'{7T), gz])

/

E[V'{7T)]

0

0=

.......... (2. 14a)

is the elasticity of substitution and is given
_1_
I-p

Therefore if the elasticity of substitution is
sufficiently large the price of water will be lower for
risk aversion than for risk neutrality. And if the
elasticity of substitution is sufficiently small then
the direction of the effect is indeterminant.

That is, the mean quantity of water is fixed and the
farmers in Sl compete for that quantity till the
price of the water just satisfies the first order
condition for water. If the set is risk neutral then
U' is a constant and the covariance is zero. This
implies that W z is equal to the expected value of the
value of the marginal product of water which was
discussed in Case I. The term E [gz] will be smaller

The effect upon the price of land. Next we
examine the price of land. We assume that
competition among the Sl farmers for the fIXed
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where () is the "degree of risk aversion."

quantity of land will compete the price of land, W3,
to a level such that

J

a

b U'(1T

With this utility function expected utility is
given by

)(p~ -w 3) f(s,r )ds = 0

.. .. . (2.16)

or
w
3

J (~ b

E(U) =

= pE [UI(1T)~ ]

a

lj;e -(}1T) f(s ,r)ds

.... (2.17)

where

E [U'(1T)]

or
w3pE[~] +p(COV[U ' (1T ),~]) /

and the first order condition for a maximum of
expected utility is given by

E[U'(1T)]

........ (2.16a)
As above the risk neutral solution is where W3 =
pE[g:J or the price of land is equal to the mean
value of the value of the marginal product of land.
The first righthand term will be larger for risk
aversion than risk neutrality if g12 and g13 agree in
sign and smaller if they disagree in sign. If g12 is
positive (negative) then Xl is smaller (larger) under
risk aversion and g13 positive (negative) implies that
g3 is smaller at each s. These imply that E[g:J is
lower for risk aversion than for risk neutrality. The
same steps yield for a disagreement in signs E[g3]
larger for risk aversion.

f(s,r)ds

=0

.... . .. . .. (2.18)

Before proceeding to the individual analyses
we note an important characteristic of these
results. In the limit as () .goes to zero, the solution
level of Xl goes to the risk indifferent or expected
profit maximization solution. The solution level of
Xl is defined by Equation 2.18, and the limit of
Equation 2.18 as (} goes to zero is

f

The sign of the second term agrees with the
sign of the covariance term. The covariance term is
negative (positive) if Us' and gS3 disagree (agree) in
sign . Since Us' is negative, the second term will be
negative (positive) if gS3 is positive (negative).
Combining the results we have W3 lower for risk
aversion if E[g3] is lower for risk aversion and the
covariance is negative. These conditions will exist if
g12 and g13 agree in sign· and if gS3 = g2]Z is
positive. If the production function is CobbDouglas or CES then g12, g13 and g23 are all
positive, implying that W3 is lower for risk aversion
than for risk neutrality. If E[g:J is higher for risk
aversion and the covariance is negative then w3 will
be higher for risk aversion than risk neutrality.
This result will hold if g12 and g13 disagree in sign
while g23 is negative.

a

b

(pgI (Xl ,(1 +s)zO) - WI) f(s,r)ds = 0 . (2. 18a)

which is first order condition for the risk neutral
case Equation 1.8. Thus in the limit (} goes to zero
the solution Xl goes to the solution that was
analyzed in the risk neutral section. An additional
important point is that the functional relationship
between Xl and (} is continuous given the continuity
assumptions that were made for U and g.
The effect upon II. We examine first the effect
of an increase in risk aversion «(}) upon Xl then
upon expected profits, expected output, and the
prices of land and water. To examine the effect
upon Xl we differentiate the first order condition
with respect to (} and then evaluate the results. The
result of this differentiation is

The effects of an increase
in risk aversion
Introduction. Here we analyze the effects of an
increase in risk aversion. To do this we assume that
the utility function exhibits constant risk aversion
and differentiate different functions with respect to
the " degree of risk aversion. " The utility function
is by Equation 2.3

......... .. ...... (2.19)
where

............... . ... (2.3)
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........... (2.20)
Since g is convex, gu ~ 0 and D is negative;
therefore the sign of x () 1 is the oppositve of that of
N. Below it is proven that if g21 is positive (negative)
then x() 1 is negative (positive). For some production functions the use of the purchased input will
increase as risk aversion increases and for others it
will decrease. If the production function is either
Cobb-Douglas or CES then g21 will be positive and
x() 1 will be negative.
We now prove that g21 > 0 «0) implies that
N>O «0) which implies that x () 1 <0 (>0). In the
proof we use the following definitions:
1)

x~ is the solution to Equation 2 .l8

3)

1To(S) = pg(x~ , (1 +s)Zo) - W1 x~

4)

If g21> 0 «0) then the parenthetical expression is
negative (positive) for all s<s°. The other two terms
are positive, i.e.,

therefore the first integral is positive (negative) if
g21>O «0). The second integral is examined in like
fashion. The bracketed term is positive for all s>S°
since it is zero at SO and no'(s) >0. The parenthetical
expression is positive (negative) if g21 >0 «0).
Since the two integrals agree in sign and their signs
are as stated in the original statement, the proof is
complete.

The
effect of
expected
profits is

effect upon E(n). We now examine the
an increase in risk aversion upon the
level of profits. The expected level of
given by

E(1T) =

Jb
a

1TO (SO) = pg(x~ ,(1 +so) - W1 x~

Evaluate N at Xl0. Multiply the first order condition
by no(s"}

............ (2.22)
This equation gives the solution level of expected
profits if Xl is treated as the solution Xl.
Differentiating Equation 2.22 with respect to (J
treating Xl as a function of () yields

E(J(iT) =

and subtract the result from N. This yields

f(s,r)ds
SO
N = fa

(pg~ (s)-w 1 )

[1To (S)-1To(sO)]e-()1T o(S)

b

f(s,r)ds + 1.0

(pg~(s)-w 1 ) [1TO(S) -1TO(SO)]

e-()1T o(S) f(s,r)ds

........... (2.21)

Examine the first integral in Equation 2.21. The
bracketed term is negative for all s<S° since it is
zero at SO and

[pg(x l ,(1+s)zO)-W 1 X 1 ] f(s ,r)ds

Xl

()

f

b

a

(pgl -w) f(s,r)ds

.... .. (2.23)

It was demonstrated above in connection with
Equation 2.13a that the integral in Equation 2.23
is positive (negative) if g21 is positive (negative). x() 1
is negative (positive) if g21 is positive (negative); thus
the two terms in Equa!:ion 2.23 are opposite in sign.
This implies that E()(n) is negative. The more risk
averse the set of Sl farmers is, the lower will be the
solution average level of profits.

The effect upon E(j). The solution expected
level of output will increase or decrease depending
upon what happens to Xl. If Xl increases (decreases)
as risk aversion increases then so will the solution
expected level of output. This is proven as follows.
The expected level of output is given by
E(y) =

f

b

a

g(x l ,(1 +s)zo) f(s ,r)ds

.... (2.24)

Differentiating Equation 2.24 with respect to (),
treating Xl as a function of () yields

E [y] = Xl
()
()

b

f

-(fa

gl (Xl' (1 +s)zo) f(s ,r)ds

a

b

(pgz-Wz) f(s,r)ds .

fa

b

nf(s,r)ds

........ . .. (2.25)
............. (2.29)

+ cov [pgz, n] )

Thus the sign of E() (J) is the same as that of x ()1
since the integral in Equation 2.25 is positive.
The effect upon wz . The analysis of the change
in the price of water is similar to that of the last
section. Again we assume that the 51 farmers
compete the price of water to a level such that
Equation 2.14 holds, or in terms of the current
utility function

f

b

a

(pg -w )e-()n f(s ,r)ds
z z

=Q

...... . (2.26)

That is , W z is defined by Equation 2.26. To
determine the effect of an increase in risk aversion
differentiate Equation 2.26 with respect to () . This
differentiation yields

f

b

(pg -w ) e-(}n [n+()x l (Pgl -w )]
z z
()
1

a

f(s,r)d~ /

f.

.. (2.27)

e-()n f(s ,r)ds

b

()4 Q

we = f a

a> 1- €yx 2

. ............ (2.30)

where a ~s. the elasticity. of su~stitution and £YX2 is
the ~lasttclty of productIOn WIth respect to X2 then
gsz is positive (see the discussion related to
Equation 2.16). 5ince the functions are continuous
in 8 there exists an interval about zero for which
the conclusions derived from Equation 2.28 hold;
therefore for 0 "small" and gsz positive, W8 z is
negative.

b

The denominator is positive, thus, the sign of
Equation 2.27 is determined by the term in braces.
The sign of the term in braces is in general
indeterminant; however, its sign can be determined
for () " close" to zero for certain cases by letting ()
go to .zero in the limit. The limit ofw() z as () goes to
zero IS

limit

The first term in this expression is zero since the
first integral is the limit of Equation 2.26 as 8 goes
to zero. This integral is, therefore, equal to zero.
The sign of the covariance term is positive
(negative) if TIs and gsz agree (disagree) in sign. TIs
= pg2z is positive, and gsz can be either positive or
negative. Combining these ideas we get Equation
2.28 negative if gsz is positive and indeterminant if
gsz is negative since in this case the two terms
would have opposite signs . If the production
function is Cobb-Douglas then gsz is positive (see
the discussion related to Equation 2.15) or if the
prod uction function is CE5 with

pgl Z f(s,r)ds . limit

xe

The effect upon W3' The analysis of the effect
of a change in risk aversion on the price of land is
similar to that just presented for the price of water.
We assume that competition among the 51 farmers
for the fixed quantity ofland will compete the price
of land, W3, to a level such that Equation 2.16
holds, or using the current utility function that

f

b

a

(pg3 -w 3)e-8rr f(s ,r)ds

=0

....... (2.31)

Differentiating Equation 2.31 with respect to 8,
treating Xl as a function of 8 yields

()4Q

... (2.28)
The first term in this limit is negative. The integral
in this term is positive (negative) if g21 is positive
(negative) and limit of X() 1 as 8 goes to zero is finite
a d is negative (positive) if g21 is positive (negative).
Thus the two signs are opposite and the term is
negative .
The second righthand term can be written

-f

b

a

(p~ -w

f(s ,r)ds) /

rrt6
3) (

fa

b

xe

pgl)

e- 8n f(s,r)ds . . (2.32)

As in the previous case we take .the limit as 8 goes
to zero. This limit is

limit
(]-+O

we = fa

This derivative is derived by differentiating the first
order condition Equation 2.13 with respect to r.
This derivative is

b

pg 13 f(s,r) ds

aX

b

f (
a

I

Tr= x~ =-~

pg 3-W )7Tf(s,r)ds .. (2.33)

where

The first term is positive if g13 and g12 disagree in
sign since both the integral and the limit will have
the same sign. These two parts of the first term will
disagree in sign if g13 and g12 agree in sign. This will
cause the first term to be negative. The second term
can be written as

D=

+ cov [pg3 '

............... (2.34)

f

b

a

[U"(7T)( pgl-W I )2 + U'(7T) pgll] f(s,r)ds

D is negative for U and g concave; thus the sign of
Xrl agrees with the sign of N. N is negative
(positive) if the product U'(n) (pgl-WJ is concave
(convex) in s. In general the conditions specified for
U and g do not imply that this product is either
concave or convex. The sign of xr l is, therefore, in
general indeterminant on a prior grounds. If,
however, the utility function exhibits constant risk
aversion and the production function is CobbDouglas or CES then some sufficient conditions for
the determination of the sign of xr l can be
identified.

7T]

The first term of this expression is zero since it is
the limit of Equation 2.31 as (] goes to zero. The
covariance is positive (negative) if gS3 = g2]Z is
positive (negative) since 1ts is positive. Collecting
these pieces of information we have for (] "close" to
zero w (] 3negative if g 13 and g 12 agree in sign and g23
is positive, and w(] 3 will be positive if g13 and g12
disagree in sign and g23 is negative. If the
production function is Cobb-Douglas or CES then
g13' g12, and g23 will all be positive and the
sufficient conditions for w (] 3 to be negative will be
satisfied.

If the utility function has constant risk
aversion, Equation 2.3, then Nand D can be written

The effects of an increase in risk
In this section we analyze the effects of an
increase in risk upon the expected level of real
income (utility), the expected level of money
income (profits), the quantity of the purchased
input, the expected level of output, and the prices
of water and land.

Some of the sufficient conditions for the determination of the sign of xr 1 can be identified for some
values of (J by taking the limit of xr l as (] goes to
zero. As (] goes to zero Xl goes to the risk neutral
solution and Nand D go to

The effect upon real income. The effect of an
increase in risk upon the expected level of real
income (utility) is tautological. The utility function
is concave; therefore, a change in risk is an increase
if, and only if, the expected level of utility falls.
That is, by definition an increase in risk makes a
risk averter worse off. These statements hold the
quantities of the inputs constant; however, if the
inputs are variable the statement still holds. This
follows since the entire expected utility function is
shifted down; thus the maximum level of expected
utility must shift down as risk increases.

limit N =

f

b

(pgl-w I) fr(s,r)ds

a

(]-+O

The effect upon Xl' We examine now the effect
of an increase in risk upon the quantity of the
purchased input. This effect is examined by
examining the derivative of Xl with respect to r.

b

limit D =
0-+ 0
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pfa

gIl f(s ,r)ds

thus

limit X lr

=

(negative). However, in general the sign of xr I is
indeterminant. If we let the utility function exhibit
constant risk aversion and let 8 go to zero this term
and Er (rr) are both determinant. In the limit as 8
goes to zero the integral of the first term goes to
zero since it becomes the first order condition.
Thus for e "close" to zero Er("IT) is negative since
the second term is negative.

....... (2.35)

b

fa gil f(s ,r)ds

8 ... 0

which is Equation 1. 9. Thus in the limit as 8 goes
to zero the derivative xr 1 for the risk aversion case
goes to the solution for the risk neutral case, and
s-ince these functions are continuous in e there
existssoine neighborhood of zero for which the risk
neutral solution. holds. This implies that if the
utility function is not "too" risk averse then·the risk
neutral analysis holds. In addition if it does not
hold for all constant risk aversion utility functions,
then the value of e is a determinant of the sign of
xr l . It was proven in the risk neutral chapter that if
the production function is Cobb-Douglas then
Equat ion 2.35 is negative. If the production
functio n is CES then xr I can be either positive or
negative; however either e>O or EYX2 < 112 are
sufficient for it to be negative.

The effect upon E(y). We next analyze the
effect of an increase in risk upon the mean level of
output. This is achieved by examining the partial
derivative of the expected value of the solution level
of output with respect to r. The expected level of
output is given by

E(y) =

rb
a

.

(pgl -WI) f(s,r)ds

(pg-w 1 XI) fr(s ,r)ds

J
a

g f/s ,r)ds

As in the earlier analyses of impacts upon the
price of water, we assume that competition among
the Sl farmers competes W z to a level such that

b
a

b

The effect upon w z . The next analysis is that
of the effect of an increase in r upon the price of
water. In this analysis as in many of the others the
effect for the general case is indeterminant;
however, for special cases the sign of the effect can
be determined. In these special cases we analyze
the sign of the partial derivative of W z with respect
to r for e "close" to zero. For these cases the
conclusions are the same as those for the risk
neutral case and were analyzed in connection with
Equation 1.17.

b

f

.... (2.38)

The integral in the first term is positive; thus the
sign of this term agrees with the sign of xr 1. The
second term is negative since.8 is concave in s. Thus
a sufficient condition for Er(y) to be negative i~ xr 1
negative. If xr I is positive then the sign of Er(y) is
indeterminant since the two terms disagree in sign.

Differentiating this fu nction with respect to r yields

+

I

............ (2.39)

(pg(x l ,(1+s)zO-w l x l )f(s,r)ds

Ia

g(x ,(1 +s)zo) f(s ,r)ds

Er(Y) = x: ! gl f(s,r)ds +
a

... . ...... . (2.36)

Er(;:) = x:

a

b

The expected profit function is

= J'l

b

and the partial derivative of E(y) with respect to r ,
treating Xl as the solution value is

The effect upon E(rr). The effect of an increase
in risk upon the expected level of profits is analyzed
by differentiating the expected profit function. The
procedure used for expected utility is not sufficient
since expected profits are not maximized. The
expected profit function shifts down as risk
increases since this function is concave; however,
since Xl changes as risk changes the possibility
exists that we shift to a point on the lower function
with a higher expected profit.

E(n)

f

.. . . . (2.37)

The second righthand integral is negative since the
profit function is concave in s. In general the sign
of the first term is indeterminant. It was
demonstrated in connection with Equation 2.13a
that the integral of this term is positive (negative) if
gZl is positive (negative); thus this term will have
the same (opposite) sign as xr I if g21 is positive

... . , . (2.40)

Differentiating Equation 2.40 with res pect to r,
treating Xl as a function of r yields
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w: = ~: fa

b

however, it was proven above that if the production
function is Cob b-Douglas then wrz is negative or if
it is CES with e>O (0)1) then wl is ,negative.

l

pglZ U (1T) f(s,r)ds

1:

b

+ x:

(pgz-WZ)(Pgl -W1)U"(1T) f(s,r)ds
I

................. (2.41)

f(s,r)ds

The sign of this expression is not implied by the
assumed characteristics ofU and g; thus in general
this sign is indeterminant. If we assume a constant
risk aversion utility function then Equation 2.41
becomes

The effect upon W3. The analysis of the effect
of a change in risk upon the price of land, W3, is
very similar to that of wz . We examine the sign of
wr 3 which in general is indeterminant. If we assume
that the utility function exhibits constant risk
.a version and let (J go to zero in the limit this case
,again approaches the risk neutral case. We assume
competition yields a W3 such that

fa

b

(p~ -W3)U1(1T) f(s,r)ds = 0

....... (2.44)

Differentiating Equation 2.44 with respect to r
yields

~ = (x~

fa

1:

b
I

pgl 3U (1T) f(s,r)ds

b

+
.................. (2.42)

f(s,r)ds

The sign of Equation 2.42 is also indeterminant
from the a priori conditions on g. However, in the
limit as (J goes to zero wr z goes to

limit

(} .. o

fr(s,r)dV

r

Ja

gl z f( s,r )ds
.

limit

+

(x~

f.

f.

b

(J ..

b
l

U (1T) f(s,r)ds . .. (2.45)

~ =p

+

b

(x: Ia

b
pg 1 3 f( s,r )ds

O

gl Z f(s,r)ds

gz fr(s,r)dV

/fa

The sign of Equation 2.45 is indeterminant given
the assumed characteristics of U and g. If,
however, we assume a constant risk aversion utility
function and take the limit of wr 3 as (J goes to zero
we get

b

w~ = x: p

=p

I

(Pg3 -W3 ) U (1T)

fa

b

g3 fr(s,r)ds)

......... (2.46)

........ (2.43)

which is the same as Equation 1.23. The
conclusions of the analysis of Equation 1.23 was
that in general its sign is indeterminant; however, if
the production function is Cobb-Douglas or CES
with the elasticity of production with respect to X2
less than one-half, then wr 3 is negative. Since the
above functions are continuous in (J there exists
some interval above zero for which these conclusions hold for risk aversion case.

which is the same result that was given in
Equation 1.17.
Since the functions are continuous in (J there
is an interval about zero for which the risk neutral
results describe the risk aversion case. The sign of
Equation 2.43 is also in general indeterminant;
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Summary of Case II

discussed disappears. All of these effects are
negative (w () z and w() 3 hold for () "close" to zero).
And if the production function is CES the effects
are all negative with some qualifications. A
negative sign on w () z and w () 3 hold for () "close" to
zero and certain values of the parameters of the
production function.

In this section we examined the effects of risk
aversion and the effects of an increase in risk upon
several important economic variables. In both
analyses we examined the effects upon expected
profits, the level of the purchased input (xv,
expected output, and the prices of water and land.
In the analysis of an increase in risk we also
examined its impact upon the expected level of real
income (utility).

Table 6 summarizes the results of the analysis
of an increase in risk. In this analysis the variables
were differentiated partially with respect to r where
Table 6. Summary of the effects of an Increase In
risk.

In Table 5 we summarize the results of the
analysis of the effects of risk aversion. In that
analysis we compared the risk aversion solution to
the risk neutral solution and we differentiated the
variables with respect to the "degree" of risk
aversion, (). The two analyses yielded very similar
results; however the partial derivatives of the price
of water, w ()z, and of the price of land, w () 3, with
respect to () were determinant only for () "close" to
zero. In the table a minus sign that is unqualified
indicates that the variable is negative. A sign with a
qualification indicates that the condition(s) is (are)
sufficient for the sign to hold.

Production Function
Cobb-Douglas

Concave

Variable

CES

(lh
r

E

E/rr)

- if d and e
+ if d and f

- if d

- if a and d
or band d
+ if c and d

xl

- if d

- if d

- if d

E/y)

- if d and e

- if d

- if a and d
or band d

- if d

- if band d

- if d

- if a and d
or band d
+ if c and d

r

The two parts of the table are very similar and
only the portion related to the partial derivatives
will be discussed here. An increase in risk aversion
will lower expected profits. The precautionary
actions of risk averters will lower expected profits.
These actions, however, may either increase or
decrease the quantity of the purchased input and
expected output. This can cause the price of water
to fall or maybe to rise. The price of land can either
increase or decrease. If, however, the production
function is Cobb-Douglas the ambiguity just

w

z
r

3
r

w

<V2

a) 0 <€

YX 2

b) 0

<p<

d) () "close" to zero

1

e)g221<0

1-€

p

c)

<

YX 2

<0

1-2€

YX 2

Tab!e 5. Summary of the effects of risk aversion.
Variable

Concave

Production Function
Cobb-Douglas

CES

Variable

Concave

Production Function
Cobb-Douglas

CES

E()(rr)
- if a
+ifb

x()

- if a
+ ifb

- if a
+ifb

E()(y)

- if a
+ifb

- if c

1

- if d

- if f
+ifg
a) g21

>0

w()

z

- if c and e

-ife

3

- if e and f
+ if e and g

- if e

w()

d)

a>

2

and g23 < 0
b) g21 < 0

e) () "close" to zero

c) gsz > 0

f) g12 and g 13 agree in sign

55

- if e

g) g 12 and g 13 disagree in sign

l-€yx

andg 23

- if d and e

>0

If the risk neutral conclusions do not hold for all

r is the shift parameter in the density function. An
increase in r causes a shift of the density function
that has the characteristics of a mean preserving
spread. An increase in risk will lower real income
(expected utility) for the Sl set of farmers. This is
not too surprising since it simply says that risk
averters are made worse off by an increase in risk,
which is true by definition. The other effects are
indeterminant except in the limit as e goes to zero.
In the limit as e goes to zero the results go to the
risk neutral results. Since the functions are
continuous in e there exists an interval about zero
for which the risk neutral results hold for risk
averters. That is, if the utility function is not "too"
risk averse then the risk neutral conclusions hold.

risk averters then the degree of risk aversion
becomes a determinant of the sign of the partial
derivatives.
For e "close" to zero expected profits fall as
risk increases. The quantity of the purchased input
and the mean level of output will decrease
(increase) if gZ21 is negative (positive), and in
general the sign on wl and wr 3 are indeterminant.
However, if the production function is CobbDouglas all of the above partial derivatives are
negative for () "close" to zero. If the production
function is CES then for () "close" to zero the
values of the parameters affect the signs.
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